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Choosing to Have Less Choice 
 
Summary 
This paper investigates choice between opportunity sets. I argue that individuals may 
prefer to have fewer options for two reasons: First, smaller choice sets may provide 
information and reduce the need for the agent to contemplate the alternatives. Second, 
contemplation costs may be increasing in the size of the choice set, making smaller sets 
more desirable even when they do not provide any information to the agent. I identify 
which of these reasons drives individual behavior in a laboratory experiment. I find 
strong support for both the information and cognitive overload arguments. The effects 
do not disappear as participants gain experience with the task. Applications of these 
results include firms’ choices of product variety, as costs increase with the number of 
products offered, and the design of government policies, such as the Medicare Drug 
Discount Card Program, in which older citizens can choose among numerous cards for 
discounts in prescription drugs. 
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This paper investigates choice between opportunity sets. I argue that individuals may prefer
to have fewer options for two reasons: First, smaller choice sets may provide information and
reduce the need for the agent to contemplate the alternatives. Second, contemplation costs
may be increasing in the size of the choice set, making smaller sets more desirable even when
they do not provide any information to the agent. I identify which of these reasons drives
individual behavior in a laboratory experiment. I ﬁnd strong support for both the information
and cognitive overload arguments. The eﬀects do not disappear as participants gain experience
with the task. Applications of these results include ﬁrms’ choices of product variety, as costs
increase with the number of products oﬀered, and the design of government policies, such as
the Medicare Drug Discount Card Program, in which older citizens can choose among numerous
cards for discounts in prescription drugs.
"As a neophyte shoe salesman, I was told never to show customers more than three pairs of
shoes. If they saw more, they would not be able to decide on any of them." Milton Waxman, shoe
salesman.1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Individuals often believe that more choices are better than less. This has been supported by research
in economics and psychology. Firms sometimes seem to agree, and supply an increasing variety of
products to consumers in an attempt to perfectly match their tastes. Recent evidence, however,
suggests that increases in the number of options may decrease utility. In this paper, I conduct
a laboratory experiment to investigate why this may be true. I study whether smaller sets are
∗Web: http://pubweb.northwestern.edu/~sms965. E-mail: m-salgado@northwestern.edu. I am indebted to
Charles Manski, Joel Horowitz, Keith Murnighan and Rob Porter for helpful disussions, suggestions and advice.
I also thank Roc Armenter, Eddie Dekel, Kripa Freitas, Pablo Guerron, Piotr Kuszewski, Gustavo Manso, Muriel
Niederle, Alessandro Pavan, Viswanath Pingali, Carmit Segal, Itai Sher, Kristina Steﬀenson, Tomasz Strzalecki,
Alex Tetenov and seminar participants at Northwestern University for helpful comments. Financial support from
Northwestern University’s Graduate Research Grant is greatfully acknowledged. All errors are mine.
1"So Much Choice. How Do I Choose?": Letter to the editor. The New York Times, Jan 22, 2004.
1preferred because they provide information about the ranking of the alternatives, or whether it is
the decrease in the costs of processing information that make smaller sets more desirable.
In most of the economics literature, increasing the size of the choice set must weakly increase
utility since the individual can always costlessly ignore part of the large set, and considering it
can make him ﬁnd a more desirable alternative. Research in psychology has also shown a positive
relationship between the ability to choose (versus not being given this option) and intrinsic moti-
vation (Deci, 1975, 1985), happiness (Taylor and Brown, 1988, Taylor, 1989) and a sense of control
(Langer, 1975, Schulz and Hanusa 1978).
Recent papers, however, have shown that individuals are more likely to consume a product or
enroll in a program when fewer options are available. Iyengar and Lepper (2000) show that sales of
exotic jams increase when consumers are presented with a relatively small number of options (6)
rather than a large number (24). They conclude that choice overload happens when more options
are available, demotivating consumers. Similarly, Iyengar, Jiang and Huberman (2004) studied
decisions of employees regarding whether to enroll in 401(k) retirement plans and found increases
in participation in plans that oﬀer fewer than 10 funds versus plans that oﬀer 10 or more.
Bertrand et al (2005) quantify diﬀerent psychological factors by examining take-up on loans
oﬀered though the mail to 60,000 clients by a lender in South Africa. To study the eﬀect of overload
on take-up, letters diﬀered in the number of loans they described. They found that loan take-up
increased 0.60 percentage points when fewer loans were described, the same eﬀect as reducing the
monthly interest rate by 2.3 percentage points2. Finally, Boatwright and Nunes (2001), show that
removing low-selling items from supermarket shelves can increase aggregate sales by on average
11%.
A recent discussion in the media is concerned with the reasons for the low enrollment in the
Medicare Prescription Drug Discount Card program, which started in June 2004 and ends in De-
cember 2005. Seniors who enroll can choose one of about 70 diﬀerent cards (the number depends
on the state of residency) and present the card at pharmacies for discounts of up to 25% on pre-
scriptions. The card costs $30 or less (depending on the state) and about 4.7 million low-income
Medicare recipients have the card paid for by the government and are eligible for a $600 subsidy in
2005 and 2006. Despite these beneﬁts, in July 2005 only about 40% of the eligible low-income ben-
eﬁciaries had enrolled in the program. Critics attributed this partly to the large number of cards
available. Senator Kent Conrad of North Dakota introduced legislation in June 2004 to reduce
the number of cards from about seventy to three for each region of the country. Conrad argued:
"What I found is that people are confused. They are confused because there are so many cards."
(Charleston Gazette, June 9, 2004). Learning when people prefer to have fewer options may help
policy makers design programs and thus have important policy and welfare implications.
Understanding when people beneﬁt from having fewer options is also important to ﬁrms, as
the supply of product variety is a central decision. Several authors (Ravenscraft (1983), Bayus
and Putsis (1999) and Draganska and Jain (2005)) have argued that costs of variety are convex
2The interest rates oﬀered by the lender in the experiment were between 3.25% and 11.75% per month.
2due to the complexity of the manufacturing process. Evidence suggests that increases in product
line are associated with lower brand loyalty and worse relations with distributors and retailers. If
consumers are better oﬀ with less variety, then ﬁrms can increase proﬁts by reducing product lines.
Some ﬁrms have realized these gains in strategy. During the ﬁrst half of the 1990’s, Proctor and
Gamble cut its number of hair care products by almost half and increased market share by ﬁve
percentage points. The president of the company, Durk I. Jager, said (Business Week, Sep 9th,
1996): "It’s mind-boggling how diﬃcult I’ve made it for them over the years." Identifying when
people prefer to have fewer options may help ﬁrms make decisions regarding the supply of product
variety.
In this paper, I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate why individuals may prefer to
have fewer options. I am concerned with situations in which individuals are initially uncertain
about which is the best alternative for them in a choice set. To reduce this uncertainty, they can
gather and process information, i.e., contemplate, which is costly in terms of eﬀort and time. I
consider two reasons for individuals to prefer fewer options: First, they may believe that a smaller
set provides information about the ranking of alternatives, reducing necessary contemplation. I
call this the value-of-information argument. Second, contemplation costs may be increasing in the
size of the choice set, causing smaller sets to be more desirable than larger sets even when they
don’t provide any information to the agent. I say that such an individual has cognitive overload. I
identify which of these reasons drives individual choice between sets in an experiment. This is the
key contribution of this paper.
Value-of-information: An individual will prefer a smaller set if he believes it will provide him
information about which alternatives he would choose, were he to engage in contemplation. Thus,
fewer options are preferred if the individual trusts how the alternatives in the set were selected. In
this case, a smaller set allows the individual to save contemplation costs.
Situations in which individuals prefer to restrict their choice sets because they believe a selec-
tion mechanism can help them make a better decision occur frequently in practice. For example,
we invest money in mutual funds trusting that analysts have done a good job of gathering and
processing information about stocks, so we don’t have to incur these costs. We take recommenda-
tions of friends and magazines regarding restaurants because we trust their selection criteria and
want to save time gathering this information ourselves. More generally, one can delegate a decision
to someone we fully trust to save the costs of gathering and processing information. The idea that
choice sets provide information about the ranking of alternatives has been suggested by Luce and
Raiﬀa (1957) and McFadden (1999), and is related to the literature on herding and imitation, such
as Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992).
Under the value-of-information argument, a smaller set whose alternatives are randomly selected
from a larger set should never be preferred because random selection does not provide the agent
with any information. In fact, the individual can replicate the random selection himself when given
a larger set by randomly ignoring extra alternatives, and considering them may increase his utility.
This fact will be important to identify the eﬀect of value-of-information in the experiment.
3Cognitive overload: The cognitive overload argument posits that fewer options may be preferred if
contemplation costs are increasing in the size of the choice set. This happens if individuals do not
ignore some options when faced with larger sets, but instead gather and process more information
as the set increases. This behavior is consistent with the use of heuristics that necessarily consider
a larger number of alternatives when more options are available, such as sequentially eliminating
the worst option. If there is a ﬁxed cost of each elimination, contemplation costs will increase with
set size. In these situations, an individual will prefer smaller sets if decision costs increase more
than the beneﬁts with the expansion of the choice set. One implication is that fewer alternatives
may be preferred even if they are a random selection from a larger set. This diﬀerence from the
value-of-information allows me to contrast the two diﬀerent explanations in the experiment. The
idea that consumers can become overwhelmed by "too much choice" has been suggested by Jacoby
(1984), Huﬀman and Kahn (1998) and Iyengar and Lepper (2000)3.
There are other reasons why individuals may prefer to have fewer options. For example, utility
m a yb ya ﬀected by anticipated feelings of regret and rejoice in decisions under uncertainty, as
argued by Loomes and Sudgen (1982). I will discuss how giving feedback to induce anticipated
regret aﬀects choice of sets in the experiment.
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) show that smaller opportunity sets may be preferred in the presence
of temptation. For example, a person on a diet may not buy chocolates to avoid the temptation
of eating chocolates in the future. In games such as a two player prisoner’s dilemma, having fewer
actions can make agents better oﬀ by excluding the Pareto dominated outcome. In decisions under
ambiguity, Manski (2000) shows that increasing the choice set may also reduce welfare because an
ex-ante undominated action may turn out to be dominated when ambiguity is resolved. Although
important, I do not focus on these arguments because they do not seem central to explain the
empirical problems I am concerned with in this paper.
The experiments
In view of the theoretical explanations discussed above, I investigate why individuals may prefer
to have fewer options in a laboratory experiment. In particular, if people choose to restrict their
choice sets, is it because of the value-of-information or cognition overload? Alternatively, are
individual choices consistent with the assumption that more options are always weakly preferred?
Participants went through the following two-stage decision in several circumstances: First, they
were asked to choose between sets of lotteries in which one set was a subset of the other. Participants
could see the large set but not the small one. Instead, they were given information about how the
lotteries in the small set were selected from the large set. After they chose the set, they could see
it and choose one lottery from it.
3The presence of contemplation costs alone is not suﬃcient for individuals to prefer fewer options. Ergin (2003)
proves a representation theorem for preferences in which the utility function derived incorporates contemplation costs
that can be used to reduce uncertainty. His key axiom is monotonicity; that is, more options are weakly preferred by
the agent. Therefore, he implicitly assumes that individuals can ignore extra alternatives as their choice set increases
i ns i z e .W h e nt h i si st r u e ,i n d i v i d u a l sc o n t e m p l a t eo n l yw h e nd o i n gs oi n c r e a s e sb e n e ﬁts more than costs.
4In the ﬁrst round, the small set was selected randomly from the large set. Second, it was chosen
by 10 graduate students in economics and Kellogg, with the 5 lotteries chosen most often comprising
the small set. In the third round, the small set included the only 5 undominated lotteries in the
large set.
By varying how the alternatives in the subsets were selected and making participants aware of
this, identiﬁcation between value-of-information and cognitive overload is possible. According to
value-of-information, an individual should never choose the small set under random selection, and
should always choose the small set of undominated lotteries. Moreover, choice of the set selected
by graduate students should be accompanied by choice of the set of undominated lotteries. On the
other hand, choice of the randomly selected set is consistent with cognitive overload. In this case,
it should be accompanied by choice of the small sets in the other two selection methods. Finally,
if more is always weakly better than less, the small set should either not be selected or be selected
only when it contained the undominated lotteries.
Next, I study how decisions changed when participants received feedback regarding their choices
of lotteries. Although feedback was given after decisions were made, participants knew in advance
that they would receive it. Thus, if anticipated feedback aﬀects utility, such as through regret,
participants’ choices may change relative to rounds without feedback.
I also investigate how choice between sets changes when individuals face a given large set
repeatedly. The question is whether experience reduces uncertainty about what the best option
is and increases the proportion of participants choosing the large set, especially in the cases of
random and student selection. Alternatively, participants could become aware of the diﬃculty in
the decision and switch to small sets, especially in the cases of student and undominated selection.
No feedback was given after choices were made, and this was known in advance.
The experiment was conducted with two groups of participants. Group 1 chose between sets of
25 lotteries and subsets of 5, while Group 2 chose between sets of 50 and subsets of 5. All large
sets had 5 lotteries that were not strictly dominated by any other. I study how the importance of
cognitive overload and value-of-information in explaining choice between sets depends on the size
of the large set.
I now describe the main results of the experiment. I found that 32% of participants in Group 1
(large set with 25 lotteries) and 48% of participants in Group 2 (large set with 50 lotteries) chose the
small set under random selection in round one, consistent with cognitive overload. When selection
was done by graduate students, 71% of participants chose the small set in Group 1 and 72% chose
the small set in Group 2, consistent with value-of-information and cognitive overload. When the
small set consisted of all undominated lotteries, it was chosen by 80% of Group 1 participants and
74% of Group 2 participants. This is consistent with some proportion of participants having zero
or very low contemplation costs. I also found that most participants who chose the small set under
random selection also did so in the other two conditions, and those who chose the small set under
graduate students’ selection but not in random selection also chose the small set of undominated
lotteries. This is consistent with the predictions from cognitive overload and value-of-information.
5When participants were given feedback, the proportion of small sets chosen under random
selection decreased to 13% in Group 1 and 22% in Group 2. This suggests that participants
were aware that randomly selected sets would likely have worse lotteries, and anticipated negative
feedback when choosing this set. Moreover, this negative feedback reduced utility from the random
sets and aﬀected decisions, possibly due to anticipated regret. The eﬀect of feedback on choice under
the other selection mechanisms was negligible, suggesting they did not expect negative feedback in
those cases.
When the large set was repeated to study the eﬀect of experience, the randomly selected sets
were chosen on average by 18% of participants in Group 1 and 31% of participants in Group 2,
and there was a statistically signiﬁcant positive trend for Group 2. This is a considerable increase
relative to when feedback was given. When sets were selected by graduate students, it was chosen
on average by 77% of participants in Group 1 and 70% in Group 2, again with a statistically
signiﬁcant positive trend for Group 2. This suggests that experience with the large set made
participants aware of the diﬃculty of the decision in Group 2, generating a switch to the small set.
Choice of the sets of undominated lotteries was not aﬀected by experience, remaining around 75%
for both Groups. Thus, I ﬁnd that participants show a preference for fewer options which remains
constant or even increases over time (Group 2).
The pooled data over rounds shows that men are more likely to choose a large set than women.
In addition, more risk-averse participants (elicited using a Holt and Loury, 2002, procedure) were
less likely to choose the randomly selected small sets, but were more likely to choose the small sets
in the other selection methods.
In another experiment, participants were given the sets of lotteries and asked to choose one
lottery from each set. Thus, they did not choose between sets. I study whether self selection into
large sets is related to higher ability, or alternatively, whether participants choosing large sets were
too optimistic about their ability, and made worse decisions on average. I ﬁnd that participants
who chose the large sets more times were also more likely than average to choose undominated
lotteries from them. Therefore, choice of large sets is positively related to ability. Those with
below average ability, on the contrary, often preferred to have their decisions restricted by other
selection mechanisms, even if this mechanism was random and could potentially be replicated by
themselves. This is consistent with some individuals having cognitive overload, in particular those
that are relatively worse than average in choosing from large sets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses the theoretical argu-
ments for why agents may prefer smaller sets. Section 3 describes the experimental design, Section
4 discusses the results, Section 5 shows the debrieﬁng to some questions the participants answered
and Section 6 concludes the paper.
62 Theoretical Explanations
2.1 Value-of-Information
Consider an individual choosing one alternative from a set. Assume he has not gathered infor-
mation about the alternatives, or has not processed his information. As a result, he is uncertain
about the ranking of the alternatives, and does not know which one is best for him. Assume this
uncertainty can be eliminated by gathering and processing information, i.e., contemplating, which
is costly. Contemplation can be interpreted as the eﬀort and time spent in making the decision.
The individual chooses the amount of contemplation. If he chooses not to contemplate, these costs
equal zero. The more he contemplates, the higher the cost, but the lower the uncertainty when
selecting an alternative from the choice set. Therefore, ﬁrst the amount of contemplation is chosen,
and then one alternative is selected taking into account the information gathered and processed
through contemplation.
An individual may prefer a subset of a larger set, depending on his beliefs regarding how these
options were selected. If he trusts the mechanism that selects the alternatives, he may prefer
the smaller set since it allows him to save the costs of contemplation. However, if an individual
believes the small set contains a relatively bad selection, the large set will be preferred, even if
contemplation costs incurred are higher. Thus, a smaller set will be preferred when it is believed
to provide information about the ranking of the alternatives that otherwise would have to be
acquired through costly contemplation. This is the value-of-information argument. For example,
an individual may prefer a small set selected by an expert who has incurred the contemplation
costs if he believes the expert and himself have similar tastes. Thus, a set with one alternative
may be preferred to any larger set if it is believed to contain exactly the alternative which would
be chosen if the individual were to contemplate from the larger set. With only one alternative, the
individual will not need to contemplate. A model of decision under uncertainty that formalizes the
value-of-information argument is developed in Appendix A.
If a smaller set is believed to have alternatives that are randomly selected from a larger set,
then the latter will always be preferred because random selection does not provide the individual
with any information about the ranking of alternatives. In fact, the individual can replicate the
smaller set himself by randomly ignoring some alternatives at no cost, and considering them may
increase his utility. Therefore, as long as individuals are able to ignore extra alternatives, fewer
alternatives that are randomly selected from a larger set will never be preferred.
The assumption of costly contemplation is important. If contemplation were costless, an indi-
vidual would be able to achieve full information by contemplating suﬃciently. Thus, smaller sets
only restrict the individual and more options are always weakly preferred. This is the traditional
framework without bounded rationality or information acquisition costs, in which more options are
always weakly better than fewer options.
72.2 Cognitive overload
I now discuss a second explanation for why an individual may prefer to have fewer options. Again,
consider an individual choosing one alternative from a set, who is uncertain about which option
is best for him. Uncertainty can be reduced by contemplation, which is costly. I now assume
an individual does not ignore extra alternatives when faced with an increasing number of choices.
Instead, he increases the amount of contemplation as the set increases. I say that this individual
has cognitive overload. In this case, he will prefer fewer options if the beneﬁts of increasing the
choice set are smaller than the resulting increase in contemplation costs.
Research on individual decision making has argued that individuals use heuristics that consider a
larger number of alternatives as the set increases, such as sequentially eliminating the worst option.
If there is a ﬁxed cost of each elimination, then contemplation costs increase as the set increases.
For example, in Tversky’s (1972) "elimination by aspects" model, each alternative is viewed as a
set of aspects and individuals reduce the number of alternatives by requiring each aspect to be
greater than some threshold value. Similarly, Russo and Dosher (1983) argue that people select
the alternative that is best on the largest number of attributes. Furthermore, they eliminate the
attribute whose diﬀerence between alternatives is smallest, and then select the alternative with
a clear advantage on the other attributes. In this case, the larger the choice set, the greater
the number of comparisons that must be made, and if there is a ﬁxed cost of each comparison,
cognitive overload occurs. Tversky et al. (1988) suggest the following choice strategy: First,
individuals check for dominating alternatives. Second, they determine whether some alternatives
have a clear advantage over the others based on diﬀerences in their attributes. Third, ties are
resolved by selecting the alternative that is best according to the most important attribute. That
is, a lexicographic rule is used. Again, this heuristic is consistent with contemplation costs that
increase with set size if there is a cost to making each binary comparison.
Research has also shown that set size aﬀects the decision-making process by inducing individuals
to switch to simpler heuristics (Payne, 1982; Timmermans, 1993; Wright, 1975). Timmermans
(1993) found that 21% of the people who faced 3 alternatives used an elimination strategy, and
this number increased to 31% of those facing six alternatives and to 77% of those facing nine. This
was accompanied by a decrease in the amount of information used, measured by the number of
attributes considered about each alternative.
Not all heuristics predict that smaller sets will be preferred when costs of processing information
exist. Simon (1956) argues that boundedly rational individuals use satisﬁcing strategies. They
choose the ﬁrst alternative encountered that gives them a minimum level of utility, ignoring the
other alternatives. In this case, larger choice sets are preferred as they increase the likelihood of
reaching the threshold value. As Simon (1997) argues, this strategy will only be used if search costs
are independent of the size and complexity of the task.
83 Experimental Design
I now describe the experiment used to study individual choice between opportunity sets. The main
objective is to identify behavior with either of the two arguments previously discussed, or with
preference for more options. Instructions can be found in Appendix B.
The experiment was conducted in the Kellogg Behavioral Laboratory at Northwestern Univer-
sity during Spring 2005. Participants spent between 20 and 60 minutes and earned an average of
$12.50. The experiment was run on a computer using the software MediaLab. Subjects were re-
cruited by sending e-mail invitations to the assistants of each department in the Weinberg College
of Arts and Sciences, School of Communications, McCormick School of Engineering and Medill
School of Journalism. The assistants were asked to forward the invitation to all students in their
department. As a result, 232 students participated in the experiment. The characteristics of the
subject pool are summarized in Table 1.
Total 232 participants
Age min = 17; max = 35; median = 20
Gender female = 0.64; male = 0.36
Field* biology = 0.14; economics = 0.25;
eng, math or stats = 0.21; language or journalism = 0.35;
psych = 0.09; other social science = 0.34
Class freshman = 0.26; sophomore = 0.24; junior = 0.20;
senior = 0.25; grad = 0.05
Stats none = 0.31; high school = 0.14; undergrad beg = 0.34;
undergrad interm = 0.14; graduate = 0.03
Econ none = 0.32; undergrad beg = 0.46;
undergrad interm = 0.22; grad = 0
*Students were allowed to choose more than one ﬁeld of study
Table 1: Characteristics of subject pool
There were two treatments in which participants made decisions involving lotteries. Treatment
1 investigates whether participants preferred a subset of a larger set, and if so, whether behavior is
consistent with value-of-information or cognitive overload. Participants ﬁrst chose between sets of
lotteries and then selected one lottery from the chosen set. Treatment 2 studies whether participants
who chose the large sets most often in treatment 1 self-selected themselves due to higher ability, or
alternatively, due to over-optimism regarding their ability, and actually made worse decisions on
average. Thus, while participants were choosing between sets in treatment 1, they were assigned the
sets in treatment 2. Diﬀerent people participated in treatments 1 and 2. Details of each treatment
are explained in the next section.
Each treatment had two groups of participants. Group 1 made choices involving sets of 5 and
25 lotteries, while Group 2 made choices involving sets of 5 and 50 lotteries. Research on cognitive
9overload suggests individuals are able to optimally process at most six alternatives (Bettman (1979),
Malhotra (1982), Wright (1975)). Thus the choice of 5 lotteries in the small sets. Each of the large
sets had 5 lotteries that were not strictly dominated by any other. In addition, the sets of 50 in
Group 2 were generated by adding 25 dominated lotteries to each set of 25 in treatment 1. Thus,
the large sets of Group 2 contained the large sets of Group 1. The usefulness of including dominated
lotteries is that it allows decisions to be ranked, facilitating the analysis of individual choices.
Lotteries paid integer amounts between $3 and $17, and varied in expected values and variances.
Most sets also contained dominated lotteries. Therefore, choice required making calculations to de-
termine which lotteries were undominated and/or thinking about the trade-oﬀs between central
tendencies and spreads. Thus, reducing uncertainty about which lottery to select required contem-
plation, which is the assumption in value-of-information and cognitive overload.
I used a Holt and Laury (2002) procedure to estimate individual levels of risk aversion. Par-
ticipants made 10 choices between 2 lotteries, depicted in Table 2. The crossover point to the
high-risk lottery can be used to estimate individuals’ degree of risk aversion if a constant relative
risk aversion utility function is assumed, i.e., if u(x)=x1−r/(1 − r),w h e r er is the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion. With this utility function, an individual is risk loving if r<0,r i s kn e u t r a l
if r =0 , and risk averse if r>0. The payoﬀs of the lotteries were selected to be the same order of
magnitude as the lotteries in Part 1, since risk attitudes may vary with the size of payoﬀs. For the
lotteries used, the risk neutral individual should select 4 safe lotteries followed by 6 risky lotteries,
which coincides with the optimal choices of an individual with r ∈ (−0.11,0.24).
Option 1 Option 2
$12 $6 $16 $3 Expected Payoﬀ
Round Prob Prob Prob Prob Diﬀerence
1 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 2.30
2 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 1.60
3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.90
4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.20
5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.50
6 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 -1.20
7 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3 -1.90
8 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 -2.60
9 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 -3.30
10 1010 -4.00
Table 2: Holt and Laury procedure to elicit risk aversion
Participants then answered questions about their strategies throughout the experiment, as well
as on their demographics. Finally, payments were made in private according the result of one lottery,
plus a $4 participation fee. The lottery was randomly selected from those chosen in the Holt and
Laury procedure with probability 0.1, and otherwise with probability 0.9 by having participants roll
10Group1 
5 & 25 lotteries
Group 2
5 & 50 lotteries
Group 1
5 & 25 lotteries
Group 2
5 & 50 lotteries
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Choose set        
Choose lottery
Elicit risk aversion
Holt and Laury (2002)
Holt and Laury, p = 0.1
Otherwise, p = 0.9
Payment
$3 to $17 from one lottery 
+ $4 show up fee
Earnings
Choose lottery
Figure 1: Overview of experimental design.
a 10 sided die. The Holt and Laury procedure was easier and shorter, and therefore less weight was
given to it. One lottery was then selected by rolling dice and the 10 sided die was rolled again to
determine the payoﬀ from the lottery. Participants were made aware of the payment method at the
beginning of the experiment. They could leave as soon as they ﬁnished. Details of each treatment
are presented next, followed by a discussion of the main ﬁndings. Figure 1 gives an overview of the
experimental design just described.
3.1 Treatment 1
I now describe treatment 1 in detail. The objective is to study whether participants were willing
to choose a smaller set over a larger one that contains it, and if so, to see whether this was due to
value-of-information or cognitive overload. There were 110 participants in this treatment, with 56
in Group 1 (large set with 25 lotteries) and 54 in Group 2 (large set with 50 lotteries). Recall that
all small sets had 5 lotteries each.
There were 24 rounds in which participants went through several two-stage decisions in which
they ﬁrst chose between two sets of lotteries, small and large, and then selected one lottery from
the chosen set. In each round, participants could see the large set of lotteries (with 25 or 50
alternatives) and asked to choose between this set and a subset of 5 lotteries, which they could not
see. Instead, they were given information about how the lotteries in the small set were selected
from the large set. After choosing a set, participants could see it. They then selected one lottery
from this set. Participants were asked to choose between: (a) the small set selected according to
the information given, or (b) the large group which contained the small one. The exact wording of
the information given to Group 1 is shown below. The wording for Group 2 is the same with "25"
11replaced by "50".
1. "This group of 5 lottery tickets was randomly selected from the group of 25 shown in (b).
This was done by having a computer program randomly select 5 numbers from 1 to 25,
corresponding to the 5 lotteries. If you want more details about how this was done, or what
computer program was used, please ask the experimenter."
2. "This group of 5 lotteries was selected from the group of 25 in (b) by 10 economics and
Kellogg graduate students. These students have extensive training in statistics, and solve
these kinds of problems all the time. Here are some details: 10 students were given the set
of 25 lotteries in (b) and asked to choose the 5 within the group which they thought were
the best. This group contains 5 of the lotteries most frequently chosen by these 10 econ and
Kellogg graduate students. If you need more details on this procedure or if you want to know
more about who are the graduate students involved, please ask the experimenter."
3. "This group of 5 lottery tickets was selected by taking the 5 best lotteries in the group of
25 shown in (b). This means that the lotteries in the small group will give you at least the
same amount of money as the lotteries in the large group, and possibly more. Alternatively,
for each lottery in the large group, there is a lottery in the small group that will give you at
least the same amount of money, and possibly more."
Rounds 1 through 3 consisted of giving participants the two-stage decision previously described.
Large sets were diﬀerent in each round. In round 1, participants chose between the small set under
random selection and a large set. In round 2, they chose between the small set selected by graduate
students and a large set. In round 3, choice was between the set of undominated lotteries and a
large set.
By varying how the alternatives in the subsets were selected and making participants aware of
this, identiﬁcation between value-of-information and cognitive overload is possible. According to
the value-of-information argument, participants should never choose the small set under random
selection (round 1) because it does not provide any information about the ranking of the alterna-
tives. Moreover it could be replicated by randomly ignoring alternatives in the large set. However,
the small set should always be chosen when it contains the best lotteries (round 3), since it allows
participants to save the contemplation costs of eliminating dominated lotteries. Choice of the small
set under random selection is, however, consistent with cognitive overload if contemplation costs
from the large set are larger than its beneﬁts. In this case, choice of the small set under random
selection should be accompanied by choice of the small set in the other two selection mechanisms,
since information should not play a role in the decisions. Finally, if more is always weakly better
than less, the small set should either not be selected or be selected only when it contained the
undominated lotteries.
In rounds 4 through 6, I study how decisions changed when participants received feedback







Rounds 1 – 3
Feedback
Experience:
Large set the same
Rounds 4 – 6
Rounds 7 – 24
Figure 2: The ﬁgure gives an overview of treatment 1. In each round, participants ﬁrst chose
between sets of lotteries. Then, the chose one lottery from the set they selected.
sets without initially seeing the small sets, but instead receiving information about how they were
selected. After choosing the set, they selected one lottery from it. The order in which the small sets
were given was the same as in rounds 1-3, namely random selection, followed by student selection
and lastly undominated set. Although feedback was given after the choices were made, participants
knew in advance that they would receive it. Thus, any eﬀect of anticipated feedback on choices,
due for example to regret, should be reﬂected in changes in behavior relative the previous rounds,
in which no feedback was given.
In rounds 7 through 24, I study choice between sets when individuals face the same large set
repeatedly. The question is whether experience reduces uncertainty about what the best option is
and increases the proportion of participants choosing the large set, especially in the cases of random
and student selection. Alternatively, participants could become aware of the diﬃc u l t yi nt h ed e c i s i o n
and switch to small sets, especially in the cases of student and undominated selection. Participants
went through the two-stage decision previously described. To study the eﬀect of experience, large
sets were the same for all 18 rounds, and so were the small sets selected by graduate students and
the sets of undominated lotteries. The sets of small sets randomly selected varied. To decrease
predictability, the order in which pairs of sets were presented varied arbitrarily, and can be found
in the instructions in appendix B. Participants were not told in advance of the number of rounds
or that large sets remained the same. No feedback was given after choices were made, and this was
known in advance. An overview of the treatment 1 is depicted in ﬁgure 2.
Figures 3-5 show the range of expected values of the lotteries given to participants. The 24
rounds are divided into 3 ﬁgures of 8 rounds each, one for each of the three sampling methods. The
vertical lines give the range of expected values of the lotteries in large sets, and the vertical boxes
13give the range of expected values of lotteries in the small sets. Recall that large sets were the same
in the learning rounds, corresponding to numbers 3-6 in the ﬁgures, as were small sets selected by
graduate students and those consisting of undominated lotteries.
Observe that the random selection reduces considerably the maximum amount that can be
earned in some of the rounds. In addition, the range of expected values is relatively large. Thus if
an individual does not like the highest expected value lottery because, for example, its variance is
so large, he might have to settle for a much lower expected value and less risky alternative. This
is not true in the other two conditions. Graduate students tended to choose very safe lotteries
with expected values around $8.5. The sets chosen by graduate students were similar to the
undominated sets in treatment 1, but tended to have lotteries with lower variance in treatment 2.





































































Figure 3: Random selection: Vertical lines give the range of expected values of lotteries in large





































































Figure 4: Student selection: Vertical lines give the range of expected values of lotteries in large
sets, and vertical boxes give range of small-student sets.
Participants then went through the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure to elicit risk-aversion,





































































Figure 5: Undominated selection: Vertical lines give the range of expected values of lotteries in
large sets, and vertical boxes give range of small-best sets.
3.2 Treatment 2
In treatment 2, participants were given the sets of lotteries of treatment 1 and asked to choose
one lottery from each of these sets. Thus, participants did not choose between sets in treatment
2. By comparing the choice of lotteries when sets are endogenous and exogenous, it is possible
to investigate whether subjects choosing the large sets in treatment 1 were self-selected into this
condition because of higher ability, or alternatively, whether they were too optimistic about their
ability and actually made worse decisions on average relative to a person in treatment 2.
There were 122 participants in this treatment, with 61 in Group 1 (large sets with 25 lotteries)
a n d6 1i nG r o u p2( l a r g es e t sw i t h5 0l o t t e r i e s ) .People participating in treatment 2 were diﬀerent
than those participating in treatment 1.
Participants were asked to choose one lottery from each of the sets presented to them. There
were two conditions, which varied according to the order in which the small and large sets were
presented. In the ﬁrst condition, subjects were given the small sets ﬁrst, in the order a subject in
treatment 1 would face had he chosen all the small sets. Then, all the large sets were given, in
the order a subject in treatment 1 would face had he chosen all the large sets. This condition had
30 participants in Group 1 and 32 subjects in Group 2. The second condition consisted of giving
subjects the large sets ﬁrst, followed by the small sets, again in the order consistent with treatment
1. There were 31 participants in Group 1 and 29 participants in Group 2. Note that participants
in treatment 1 chose a lottery from either the small or large set in each round. Thus, participants
in treatment 2 made twice as many choices of lotteries. This can generate large diﬀerences in
learning between treatments 1 and 2 and this is the reason for introducing the two conditions. No
information was given to participants regarding how the lotteries in the sets were selected. Figure
6 summarizes the design of treatment 2.
Feedback was given regarding whether participants chose a dominated lottery from the same
sets in which participants in treatment 1 received feedback. Again, they were told in advance that
they would receive feedback. Feedback was given to make choices in treatment 2 comparable to

























Figure 6: Overview of treatment 2.
Participants then went through the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure to elicit risk-aversion,
answered the questionnaire and payments were made according to the rule previously described.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Treatment 1
4.1.1 Choice of sets with no feedback: Rounds 1 - 3
Table 3 shows the proportion of small sets chosen in rounds 1 through 3. In round 1, when the
lotteries in the small sets were randomly selected from the large set, 32% of participants in Group
1 (in which participants chose between sets of 25 lotteries and subsets of 5 lotteries) chose the
small set. This number increased to 48% in Group 2, in which participants chose between sets
of 50 lotteries and subsets of 5 lotteries. A one-sided t-test rejects the null hypothesis that these
numbers are the same against the alternative that the latter is greater than the former with p-value
= 0.059 (t =1 .56).
The large proportion of participants who chose the small set in round 1 shows that cognitive
overload is an important explanation for why individuals prefer to have fewer options. As discussed
previously, the value-of-information argument predicts that randomly selected small sets should
never be chosen, since they do not provide any information and can potentially be replicated by
an individual facing the large set. However, according to the cognitive overload hypothesis, the
randomly selected small sets should be chosen if the contemplation costs incurred with the large
set are suﬃciently large. That cognitive overload exists and is important is also supported by the
increase in the proportion of participants who chose the small randomly selected set in Group 2
relative to Group 1. This suggests that to avoid the increasing costs of contemplation as the number
of alternatives in the large set increases, participants preferred to choose the small set. Section 5
presents several of the answers participants provided regarding their strategies for choosing between
sets of lotteries, and shows how some of them are clearly consistent with cognitive overload.
Table 3 also shows that 71% of participants in Group 1 and 72% of participants in Group 2 chose
the small set when the lotteries were selected by economics and Kellogg graduate students. A t-test
cannot reject the equality of these numbers with p-value = 0.50 (t =0 .00). The increase in these
numbers relative to the proportion of participants who chose the small set under random selection
indicates the importance of the value-of-information argument in explaining why individuals prefer
16to have fewer options. It is consistent with participants placing a high probability of receiving a set
containing suﬃciently good lotteries under the graduate students’ selection due to the information
provided by the set. Note, however, that generally the small sets selected by graduate students were
not identical to the sets of undominated lotteries, as can be seen from ﬁgures 4 and 5, especially
in Group 2. Thus, most participants preferred to incur a cost in terms of monetary payoﬀst os a v e
the contemplation costs of making a choice from the large set. Section 5 shows that the answers to
the debrieﬁng questions are consistent with the value-of-information argument.
Finally, the last two columns of table 3 show that 80% of participants in Group 1 and 74% in
Group 2 chose the small sets when they contained the undominated lotteries. The equality of these
numbers cannot be rejected by a one-sided t-test with p-value = 0.18 (t =0 .94). Choice of the
large set by part of the participants is consistent with zero or very low contemplation costs, due for
example to high ability. Section 5 shows that the answers to the debrieﬁng questions are consistent
with the value-of-information argument.
5x2 5 5x5 0 T - t e s t
Random 0.32 0.48 -1.59*
Student 0.71 0.72 0.00
Undominated 0.80 0.74 0.94
*P-value=0.059
Table 3: Proportion of small sets chosen in rounds 1 - 3 in Group 1 (5x25) and Group 2 (5x50).
Table 4 shows the proportion of participants who chose a small set in one of the three rounds
conditional on choosing a small set in another of the three rounds. The numbers are similar to
the unconditional proportions shown in table 3. The cognitive overload argument predicts that
when an individual chooses the small set under random selection, he also chooses a small set under
the student and undominated selections. Table 4 shows that this is true, i.e., those that chose the
randomly selected small set usually (over 70% of them) chose the small sets under the other two
selection methods. The value-of-information argument predicts that participants who choose the
small set selected by the graduate students also choose the small set of undominated lotteries. This
is supported by the data, with 88% doing so in Group 1 and 77% doing so in Group 2.
I classify participants into three types. A cognitive overload type is someone who chose the
small set in the three rounds, regardless of the selection method. A value-of-information type is a
participant who chose the small set in rounds when it was selected by graduate students and when
it contained the undominated lotteries, but not when it was a random selection from the large set.
Finally, a more is better type is an individual who either did not choose the small set at all or did
so only when it contained the undominated lotteries. This classiﬁcation is a way to determine the
175x2 5 5x5 0
P(undom|random) 0.89 (18) 0.88 (26)
P(student|random) 0.72 (18) 0.73 (26)
P(random|student) 0.33 (40) 0.49 (39)
P(undom|student) 0.88 (40) 0.77 (39)
P(student|undom) 0.78 (45) 0.75 (40)
P(random|undom) 0.36 (45) 0.58 (40)
*In parenthesis is number of observations
Table 4: Proportion of participants who chose one small set conditional on having chosen another.
Rounds 1 - 3.
relative importance of value-of-information and cognitive overload in explaining why participants
chose the small sets. Table 5 shows the proportion of people of each type.
Among participants who chose between sets of 5 and 25 lotteries, 20% were classiﬁed as cognitive
overload types, 43% as value-of-information types and 19% as more is better types. This can explain
82% of behavior in the experiment. Of participants who chose between sets of 5 and 50 lotteries,
33% were classiﬁed as cognitive overload types, 22% as value-of-information types and 15% as
more is better types, explaining 70% of behavior. Thus, the share of cognitive overload types
increased considerably from Group 1 to Group 2, while the share of value-of-information types
decreased to about half. The share of more is better types also decreased. The data is consistent
with cognitive overload becoming relatively more important than value-of-information to explain
preference for fewer options as the size of the choice set increases. This suggests the use of heuristics
that necessarily consider more alternatives as more options are available. In both groups, the share
of participants classiﬁed as more is better types is considerably lower than those who prefer fewer
options (19% vs 63% in Group 1 and 15% vs 55% in Group 2). This surprising in view of the
extensive amount of literature in economics and psychology that assumes individuals prefer to have
more options.
5x2 5 5x5 0
Cognitive Overload 0.20 0.33
Value-of-information 0.43 0.22
More is Better 0.19 0.15
Sum All 0.82 0.70
Table 5: Classiﬁcation by types: Rounds 1 - 3. A cognitive overload type is a participant who chose
the small sets regardless of the selection method. A value-of-information type is a participant who
did not choose the small set under random selection, but did so in the student and undominated
selection. A more is better type either did not choose the small set or did so only when it contained
the undominated lotteries.
In contrast to the growing literature which suggests that people sometimes prefer to have fewer
options, this paper’s contribution is to identify in an experiment the reasons why this may be
18true. The experimental results are consistent with people willing to restrict their choice sets to
save in contemplation costs, i.e. the costs of gathering and processing information. Part of the
participants did so only when the small sets were seen as providing information about the ranking
of the alternatives, as in the student and undominated selection, but when the alternatives in the
small set were a random selection from the large set, they preferred the large set. This suggests that
they believed the random set could be replicated by ignoring some alternatives. On the other hand,
part of the participants chose the small sets regardless of the selection method. This is consistent
with contemplation costs that increase as the choice set increases, i.e., with cognitive overload.
4.1.2 Feedback: Rounds 4 - 6
Rounds 4 - 6 study whether feedback regarding choice of lotteries aﬀects individual choices of sets.
Although feedback was given after decisions were made, participants knew in advance that they
would receive it. Thus, if anticipated feedback aﬀects utility, such as through regret, participants’
choices may change relative to rounds without feedback.
Table 6 shows the proportion of small sets chosen in rounds 4 - 6. In round 4, when selection was
random, 13% of participants in Group 1 and 22% of participants in Group 2 chose the small set. A
one-sided t-test rejects the null hypothesis that these numbers are the same against the alternative
that the latter is greater than the former with p = 0.10 (t = −1.30). Compared to round 1, there
is a statistically signiﬁcant reduction in this number for both groups 1 (p =0 .006,t =3 .67) and
2 (p =0 .001,t=3 .42). When sets were selected by graduate students or contained undominated
lotteries, about the same proportion participants chose them in groups 1 and 2 (p =0 .34,t=0 .41
for student selection and p =0 .41,t=0 .23 for undominated selection). There is also no signiﬁcant
change relative to rounds 5 and 6, in which no feedback was given with conﬁdence level of 0.24.
Therefore, the only signiﬁcant change observed when given feedback relative to when no feedback
was given is a reduction in the proportion of small sets chosen under random selection. This suggests
that participants expected to receive negative feedback when choosing the randomly selected set,
and avoided this by choosing the large set. Moreover, this negative feedback reduced utility from
the random sets and aﬀected decisions, possibly due to anticipated regret. On the other hand,
the data suggests that expected feedback from choice of the small sets in the other two selection
mechanisms was positive or neutral, and thus did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect their decisions.
5x2 5 5x5 0 T - t e s t
Random 0.13 0.22 -1.30**
Student 0.75 0.72 0.41
Undominated 0.77 0.76 0.23
**P-value=0.10
Table 6: Proportion of small sets chosen in rounds 4 - 6 in Group 1 (5x25) and Group 2 (5x50).
Participants received feedback after their choices
19Table 7 shows the proportion of participants who chose a small set in one of the three rounds
conditional on choosing a small set in another of the three rounds. The numbers are similar to the
unconditional proportions shown in table 6, and diﬀer from 4 mainly as a result of the diﬀerence
in the choice of randomly selected small sets previously described. The classiﬁcation by types in
table 8 shows, as expected, that the proportion of participants classiﬁed as value-of-information
types increased relative to the no-feedback rounds, while those classiﬁed as cognitive overload types
decreased. The proportion of participants classiﬁed as more is better types also increased slightly
relative to the no-feedback rounds.
5x25 5x50
P(undom|random) 0.71 (7) 0.75 (12)
P(student|random) 0.86 (7) 0.58 (12)
P(random|student) 0.14 (42) 0.18 (39)
P(undom|student) 0.83 (42) 0.82 (39)
P(student|undom) 0.81 (43) 0.78 (41)
P(random|undom) 0.12 (43) 0.22 (41)
*In parenthesis is number of observations
Table 7: Proportion of participants who chose one small set conditional on having chosen another.
Participants received feedback - rounds 4 - 6.
5x2 5 5x5 0
Cognitive Overload 0.07 0.13
Value-of-information 0.55 0.46
More is Better 0.23 0.18
Sum All 0.85 0.77
Table 8: Classiﬁcation by types: Rounds 4 - 6
4.1.3 Experience: Rounds 7 - 24
Table 9 shows the proportion of small sets chosen in rounds 7 - 24. When selection was random,
between 14% and 20% of participants in Group 1 and between 28% and 39% of participants in Group
2 chose the small set, with an average of 18% for Group 1 and 31% for Group 2. A two-sample
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test for equality of the distributions in Groups 1 and 2 rejects
the null hypothesis with p = 0.0035 (z = −2.923). As in the previous rounds, this is consistent with
an increase in cognitive overload as the choice set increases. Note that, as expected, the numbers
increased signiﬁcantly relative to the rounds in which feedback was given.
Cuzick’s (1985) test to investigate the presence of a trend in the choice of randomly selected
sets cannot reject the null hypothesis of no trend with p = 0.63 (z =0 .48) f o rG r o u p1 .F o rG r o u p
2, however, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of a positive trend at 0.05 signiﬁcance level
20(z =1 .7). This suggests that experience with the large set made participants aware of the diﬃculty
of the decision, inducing greater selection of the small set.
Table 9 also shows that between 73% and 79% of participants in Group 1 and 65% and 76%
of participants in Group 2 chose the small set when the lotteries were selected by economics and
Kellogg graduate students. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test rejects the equality of the
distribution at 0.01 level of signiﬁcance (z =2 .449). This suggests that participants thought
graduate students’ choices would be better from the set of 25 lotteries than from the set of 50. This
would be true, for example, if graduate students made more mistakes when choosing from the set
of 50 lotteries than from the set of 25.
Cuzick’s (1985) test cannot reject the null of no trend in choice of student selected sets with p
=0 . 2 3(z =0 .48) in Group 1, but in Group 2 the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of a positive
trend at 0.045 signiﬁcance level (z =1 .69).
These results show that not only are value-of-information and cognitive overload important
to explain why individuals prefer to have fewer options, but the eﬀects do not go away when a
decision is repeated, i.e., with experience. On the contrary, in the experiment experience generated
an increase in the proportion of small sets chosen under random and student selection, possibly
due to participants becoming aware of the diﬃculty in choosing from the large set.
The last two columns of Table 9 show that between 70% and 80% of participants in Group 1
and 76% and 80% in Group 2 chose the small sets when they contained the undominated lotteries.
A two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test rejects the equality of the distributions at 0.07
l e v e lo fs i g n i ﬁcance (z = −1.783). A one-sided test rejects the equality of the distribution against
the alternative that the proportion of small-best sets chosen in Group 1 tend to be smaller than
in Group 2 at 0.04 level of signiﬁcance. Cuzick’s (1985) test cannot reject the null of no trend for
both groups with p = 0.15 (z = −1.43) for Group 1 and p = 1 for Group 2 (z =0 ) .
Random Student Undominated
5x25 5x50 5x25 5x50 5x25 5x50
Rounds 7 - 9 0.14 0.28 0.73 0.65 0.80 0.78
Rounds 10 - 12 0.20 0.28 0.79 0.67 0.77 0.78
Rounds 13 - 15 0.20 0.28 0.79 0.70 0.70 0.76
Rounds 16 - 18 0.16 0.31 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.80
Rounds 19 - 21 0.20 0.39 0.79 0.76 0.75 0.80
Rounds 22 - 24 0.18 0.30 0.79 0.70 0.71 0.76
Table 9: Proportion of small sets chosen in rounds 7 - 24 in Group 1 (5x25) and Group 2 (5x50).
No feedback was given.
Table 10 shows the conditional choice of small-sets averaged over rounds. The conditional
results are similar to the marginal results and to the conditional results in the previous rounds.
215x25 5x50
P(sm-best|sm-rand) 0.81 (60) 0.88 (99)
P(sm-stud|sm-rand) 0.79 (60) 0.88 (99)
P(sm-rand|sm-stud) 0.18 (259) 0.38 (228)
P(sm-best|sm-stud) 0.85 (259) 0.92 (228)
P(sm-stud|sm-best) 0.88 (251) 0.83 (252)
P(sm-rand|sm-best) 0.19 (251) 0.35 (252)
P(sm-rand & sm-stud & sm-best) 0.12 (336) 0.25 (324)
*In parenthesis is number of observations
Table 10: Average proportion of participants who chose one small set conditional on having chosen
another. No feedback was given. Rounds 7 - 24.
The classiﬁcation by types is shown in table 11. Each group of 3 rounds of diﬀerent selection
mechanisms is classiﬁed as before. This generates six diﬀerent classiﬁcations by types, which are
then averaged. For both groups, the value-of-information is most important in explaining why
participants chose small sets. Cognitive overload is relatively small in Group 1, but becomes an
important explanation in Group 2, when the large set has 50 lotteries. This classiﬁcation accounts
for 84% of behavior in Group 1 and 89% of behavior in Group 2. Thus, a relatively small number
of participants are behaving in a way that cannot be explained in this setting.
5x2 5 5x5 0
Cognitive Overload 0.12 0.25
Value-of-information 0.53 0.39
More is Better 0.19 0.25
Sum All 0.84 0.89
Table 11: Classiﬁcation by types. Rounds 7 - 24
4.1.4 Pooled Data
I now discuss the aggregate data from all rounds of the experiment. Table 12 shows the number of
times participants chose the small sets in groups 1 and 2. Recall that each group had eight rounds
for each selection mechanism (random, students, undominated). The table shows the proportion of
participants who chose the small sets N times, where N =0 ,...,8 for each selection method. The
table also shows the proportion of subjects who chose small sets N or more times, for N =3 ...,7.
Table 12 shows that the probability of choosing the small set N+ times when selection is random
is consistently larger for Group 2 than for Group 1, with 26% of participants choosing the small-
random sets ﬁve or more times out of eight. Thus, these par t i c i p a n t ss h o w e das t r o n gp r e f e r e n c e
22N Small-Random Small-Students Small-Best
5x25 5x50 5x25 5x50 5x25 5x50
0 0.46 0.31 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.07
1 0.30 0.22 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.00
2 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.04
3 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04
4 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.07
5 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.13
6 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.02
7 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.11
8 0.07 0.09 0.59 0.41 0.52 0.52
3+ 0.16 0.37 0.82 0.81 0.84 0.89
4+ 0.14 0.31 0.79 0.74 0.80 0.85
5+ 0.14 0.26 0.75 0.72 0.73 0.78
6+ 0.14 0.22 0.73 0.63 0.71 0.65
7+ 0.09 0.13 0.68 0.54 0.66 0.63
Table 12: Proportion of subjects who chose N and N or more small sets.
for the small randomly selected sets even after experimenting with the large sets. This is a very
large number considering that they could have ignored extra lotteries from the large sets, and is
consistent with the argument that individuals do not do that in practice, i.e., they have cognitive
overload. This eﬀect is not as strong in Group 1, which suggests that contemplation costs were
not as large in this case because of the smaller number of alternatives. A one-sided Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney rank-sum test of equality of distributions rejects the null hypothesis at 0.036 level
of signiﬁcance (z = −1.798).
The table also shows that participants in both groups seem to trust the ability of the graduate
students in selecting lotteries, with over 70% of them choosing the student selected sets ﬁve or
more times out of eight. This increase in the proportion of small sets chosen when compared to
random selection supports value-of-information as an important explanation for why participants
preferred fewer options. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test cannot reject the null of equality
of distributions of Group 1 and Group 2 with p = 0.25 (z =1 .149). Thus, participants seem to be
equally trusting of the ability of graduate students choices in both groups.
The results for the choice of undominated sets are similar to the choice of student selected sets.
Over 70% of participants chose the undominated sets ﬁve or more times out of eight, both in groups
1 and 2. In addition, one cannot reject the equality of the distributions using a Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney rank-sum test with p = 0.91 (z = −0.10). T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hs o m ep r o p o r t i o no f
participants having zero or very low contemplation costs.
Table 13 classiﬁes participants into types. A cognitive overload type each small set ﬁve of more
times out of eight. A value-of-information type chose the randomly selected sets at most three
times out of eight, and the student selected set and the undominated set ﬁve or more times out of
eight. A more is better type chose the random and student sets at most three times each. These
23three types account for over 85% of behavior in the sample.
Around 65% of participants can be classiﬁed into one of the ﬁrst two types, that is, with generally
preferring to have fewer options, and slightly over 20% of participants’ behavior is consistent with
preference for more options. Of those who preferred less, value-of-information is found to be the
m o s ti m p o r t a n tr e a s o ni nb o t hg r o u p s .T h ee ﬀect of cognitive overload is not very important for
Group 1. However, it accounts for 24% of the behavior in Group 2, outweighing the more is better
types. As was previously argued, this suggests that as the set size increases, so do contemplation
costs and thus the importance of cognitive overload as an explanation for why individuals prefer to
have less choices. It is interesting to see that the proportion of more is better types is constant from
Group 1 to Group 2, which generally occurs as well in the disaggregated analysis of the rounds.
5x2 5 5x5 0
Cognitive Overload 0.11 0.24
Value-of-information 0.54 0.43
More is Better 0.21 0.22
Sum All 0.86 0.89
Table 13: Classiﬁcation by types: Pooled data.
4.1.5 Further Analysis of Pooled Data
I estimate the expected number of times participants chose the small sets conditional on demo-
graphic variables and levels of risk aversion as elicited by the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure.
The maximum number of times each small set could be chosen was 8, since there were a total of 24
rounds and there were three sampling methods. I include two dummy variables (dummy student
and dummy undom) to account for the diﬀerent sampling conditions. Table 14 presents the results.
The dummy coeﬃcients on the selection process are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at 5%
for Group 1 but not for Group 2. For Group 1, the average number of times the small set is chosen
under the student and best selection is around 4.6 and 4.8, respectively, larger than under random
selection, conditional on the regressors. The level of risk-aversion is interacted with the dummy
variables for the selection methods. The negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (at 5%) on
risk-aversion means that higher levels of risk-aversion are associated with fewer choices of the small
randomly selected sets. The coeﬃcient is small in magnitude, however. When interacted with the
dummies, risk-aversion is again statistically signiﬁcant at 5% but now has a positive sign. Thus,
more risk-averse participants chose on average more student or undominated selected sets than less
risk-averse participants. Gender is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% in Group 1 and at 5% in Group
2. In both cases, males chose the small sets fewer times on average than females (0.89 in Group 1
and 1.31 in Group 2) conditional on the other regressors. Field of study is generally not signiﬁcant
(except eng/math/stats in Group 2, at 10%). Participants with more background in economics on
24average chose fewer student selected sets in Group 2 (signiﬁcant at 5%) and more undominated
sets in Group 1 (signiﬁcant at 10%).
Dep. variable: Number of times small set is chosen
Group 1 (5 x 25) Group 2 (5 x 50)
Indep. variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
constant 11.85 7.67 8.14* 2.75
dummy student 4.48* 1.98 -0.11 1.83
dummy best 4.17* 1.97 -0.65 1.72
age -0.40 0.43 -0.01 0.14
risk-aversion -0.12* 0.20 -0.67* 0.24
risk-aversion*dummy stud -0.20 0.27 0.88* 0.33
risk-aversion*dummy undom -0.34 0.27 1.12* 0.34
gender (d=0, female) -0.89** 0.47 -1.31* 0.44
biology -0.51 0.90 0.64 1.76
eng/math/stats 0.07 1.01 -2.56** 1.40
language/journ/soc science 0.66 0.77 -0.62 0.91
psychology -0.89 1.71 -1.39 1.39
more than one ﬁeld -0.65 0.68 -0.51 0.82
c l a s s 0 . 3 70 . 4 30 . 2 00 . 2 5
stats background -0.06 0.43 0.13 0.24
econ background -0.74 0.64 -0.46 0.40
econ back*dummy stud 0.56 0.86 -2.22* 1.07
econ back*dummy undom 1.46** 0.86 -1.45 0.94
stats back*dummy stud 0.007 0.59 0.01 0.67
stats back*dummy undom -0.33 0.59 -0.07 0.37
N = 168 for treatment 1; N = 162 for treatment 2
*Statistically signiﬁcant at 5%
**Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%
Table 14: Number of times small set is chosen conditional on independent variables
Table 15 shows the average time in seconds spent in choosing a lottery from the sets selected.
It can be seen that participants who chose the small sets spent on average half of the time as
participants who chose the large sets in rounds 1 - 6. From then on, because the large sets were
the same, participants who chose the small sets were taking relatively more time to select a lottery.
The decrease in time spent making each decision is probably due to learning and experience with
the task. Because of the self-selection into the sets, however, one cannot claim there is a causal
relation between observed contemplation costs and choice of sets.
Participants’ decisions can be ranked by whether or not they chose a strictly dominated lottery
from each set selected. Table 16 shows the proportion of participants who chose an undominated
25Round Large Small
5x25 5x50 5x25 5x50
1 - Random 62.0 96.3 28 41.4
2 - Student 62.2 63.6 37.6 31.1
3-U n d o m 46.6 72.8 43.8 31.7
4 - Random 73.4 77.3 14.5 34.5
5 - Student 48.5 38.7 39.8 29.4
6-U n d o m 51.0 47.1 46.3 26.6
7 - Random 79.9 77.1 19.2 33.4
8 - Student 57.7 49.6 42.6 37.7
9-U n d o m 55.2 29.8 36.1 27.2
10 - Student 39.3 26.0 29.0 29.0
11 - Random 41.6 31.0 34.2 32.7
12 - Undom 28.1 8.0 24.9 21.2
13 - Random 33.3 27.8 26.4 22.0
14 - Student 33.0 13.1 17.0 22.5
15 - Undom 19.1 8.1 19.0 16.2
16 - Student 17.2 6.3 17.1 18.0
17 - Random 23.3 15.1 27.1 18.8
18 - Undom 11.8 2.4 15.8 15.5
19 - Random 19.4 12.2 17.7 17.6
20 - Undom 8.1 3.5 11.5 13.0
21 - Student 10.6 6.7 12.0 13.7
22 - Undom 10.1 4.7 11.5 11.8
23 - Random 17.6 12.4 24.0 13.5
24 - Student 11.9 5.3 12.4 12.5
Table 15: Average time spent choosing a lottery per round (in seconds)
26lottery. The number in parenthesis shows how many people chose each set. The proportion of
participants who chose a lottery that is not dominated is much higher for sets of 25 lotteries when
compared to large sets of 50 lotteries. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test rejects the null hypothesis
that the samples come from the same distribution for all three conditions as well as for the pooled
data with 0.01 signiﬁcance level. Because of self-selection into sets, it is not possible to analyze
how choice of sets was aﬀected by the likelihood that a participant chose an undominated lottery.
However, this can be studied by comparing choices with those from Treatment 2, in which there
is no self-selection as participants were assigned the sets of lotteries, instead of choosing between
them. I now discuss these issues.
Round Large Small
5x25 5x50 5x25 5x50
1 - Random 0.63 (38) 0.57 (28) 0.83 (18) 1.00 (26)
2 - Students 0.88 (16) 0.60 (15) 0.90 (40) 0.90 (39)
3-U n d o m 0.91 (11) 0.57 (14) 1.00 (45) 1.00 (40)
4 - Random 0.90 (49) 0.64 (42) 0.71 (7) 1.00 (12)
5 - Students 0.79 (14) 0.80 (15) 0.90 (42) 0.90 (39)
6-U n d o m 0.77 (13) 0.85 (13) 1.00 (43) 1.00 (41)
7 - Random 0.85 (48) 0.79 (39) 1.00 (8) 1.00 (15)
8 - Student 0.93 (15) 0.58 (19) 0.90 (41) 0.89 (35)
9-U n d o m 0.91 (11) 0.58 (12) 1.00 (45) 1.00 (42)
10 - Student 1.00 (12) 0.61 (18) 0.93 (44) 0.92 (36)
11 - Random 0.84 (45) 0.67 (39) 1.00 (11) 0.93 (15)
12 - Undom 0.85 (13) 0.67 (12) 1.00 (43) 1.00 (42)
13 - Random 0.87 (45) 0.69 (39) 1.00 (11) 0.87 (15)
14 - Student 1.00 (12) 0.63 (16) 0.91 (44) 0.79 (38)
15 - Undom 0.94 (17) 0.62 (13) 1.00 (39) 1.00 (41)
16 - Student 0.93 (14) 0.60 (15) 0.90 (42) 0.80 (40)
17 - Random 0.91 (47) 0.62 (37) 1.00 (9) 0.71 (17)
18 - Undom 1.00 (14) 0.64 (11) 1.00 (42) 1.00 (43)
19 - Random 0.91 (45) 0.76 (33) 1.00 (11) 1.00 (21)
20 - Undom 1.00 (14) 0.73 (11) 1.00 (42) 1.00 (43)
21 - Students 0.83 (12) 0.62 (13) 0.95 (44) 0.78 (41)
22 - Undom 0.94 (16) 0.69 (13) 1.00 (40) 1.00 (41)
23 - Random 0.96 (46) 0.74 (38) 0.90 (10) 0.69 (16)
24 - Students 1.00 (12) 0.75 (16) 0.91 (44) 0.79 (38)
*The number of observations is in parenthesis.
Table 16: Proportion of participants who chose an undominated lottery
4.2 Treatment 2
In treatment 2, participants were given the sets of lotteries of treatment 1 and asked to choose
one lottery from each of these sets. Thus, participants did not choose between sets in treatment
272. By comparing the choice of lotteries when sets are endogenous to when they are exogenous, it
is possible to investigate whether subjects who chose the large sets the most in treatment 1 self-
selected themselves into larger sets because of higher ability, or alternatively, whether they were
too optimistic about their ability and actually made worse decisions on average relative to a person
choosing from the large set in treatment 2.
I rank participants’ decisions according to whether or not they chose a dominated lottery from
each of the sets they faced. In treatment 1, they faced only the sets they selected. In treatment 2,
participants received all the sets which a treatment 1 participant could potentially face.
Recall that there were two conditions in treatment 2, which varied according to the order
in which sets were given to participants, with some receiving the small sets ﬁrst, while others
receiving the large sets ﬁrst. This was done to control for possible learning eﬀects. In the analysis
that follows, I use the pooled data of conditions 1 and 2 since a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum
test of equality of the distributions of the two conditions cannot reject the null with p = 0.65 (z =
-0.449). The results of the analysis are similar regardless of whether the pooled or disaggregated
data is used.
To study how selection into large sets was related to ability, I compare the average proportion of
undominated lotteries chosen by individuals who selected a large set in treatment 1 to the average
proportion of undominated lotteries chosen by participants in treatment 2. If a participant in
treatment 1 has relatively high ability, his average performance over all large sets chosen should be
higher than the average performance of a participant in treatment 2. Then, I study whether higher
ability participants in treatment 1 were more likely to choose a large set over a small one.
Let pj,2 denote the average proportion of participants who chose an undominated lottery in large
set j =1 ,...,J in treatment 2. Let Iji1 denote an indicator function that equals 1 when individual i
in treatment 1 chose an undominated lottery from large set j, and zero otherwise. Then, Iji1 −pj,2
is participant i’s performance in choosing from set j relative to the average in treatment 2 and
J P
j=1
(Iji1 − pj,2) is i’s average performance relative to participants in treatment 2 over all sets. The
larger this number, the better is participant i of treatment 1 relative to the average of treatment 2
in choosing lotteries from the large sets. Figure 7 shows this variable across participants and the
number of large sets chosen by them in treatment 1, as well as the correlations.
The correlation between the number of times a large set is chosen and the average relative
performance of individuals in treatment 1 is 0.32 for Group 1 and 0.18 for Group 2. Thus, par-
ticipants with relatively better performance in choosing from large sets of lotteries were less likely
to select a small set. However, participants who chose relatively more dominated lotteries from
large sets preferred to restrict their choices more often by choosing small sets. This is evidence
that participants self-selected themselves into large sets due to higher ability, although the eﬀect
decreases from Group 1 to Group 2. These results do not change signiﬁcantly when one conditions
on demographic variables.
Note that participants with relatively worse performance often chose small sets that were ran-
domly selected, and thus were likely to have relatively worse lotteries. Therefore, they seemed
28to prefer not choosing a dominated lottery directly. One possible explanation is that participants
were not willing to randomly select lotteries, and this generated cognitive overload. To avoid it,
participants preferred to choose lotteries from smaller sets.
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Figure 7: Number of large sets chosen vs average diﬀerence between probability of choosing un-
dominated in treatment 1 and treatment 2.
5D e b r i e ﬁng
I now show what some of the participants wrote in response to the following question in the last
part of the experiment: "Please tell us about your strategy for choosing between GROUPS of
lottery tickets. I would really appreciate a detailed response to this question."
5.1 Cognitive overload types wrote...
• "It’s better to deal with a smaller group of numbers rather than a large group of numbers.
Dealing with a larger number creates uncertainty and confusion. You are more likely to be
comfortable dealing with a smaller group of numbers." (age: 21; gender: female; undergrad-
uate; ﬁeld: economics, senior)
• "I chose the small group of 5 tickets because it was easier to pick between 5 tickets than 25
tickets." (age: 22; gender: female; undergraduate; ﬁeld: economics/engineering, senior)
• "I chose group A every time because I felt it would be easier to narrow it down from 5 choices
than from 25 choices. Also, I chose group A when they were chosen by Kellogg students as
the best possible choices." (age: 21; gender: male; undergraduate; ﬁeld: other social science,
junior)
• "I am terrible with any form of math, so I just chose the smaller groups because someone or
something already made the decisions for me." (age: 19; gender: male; undergraduate; ﬁeld:
other, freshman)
29• "I picked the smaller group because it allows me to determine exactly which of the 5 choices
yields the highest return." (age: 22; gender: female; undergraduate; ﬁeld: language, senior)
• "I didn’t want to have to look at all of the tickets so I pretty much always chose option 1 to
save time. I knew that one third of the time, this probably wasn’t the best decision (when
they were chosen at random), but for the sake of time it seemed worth it." (age: 21; gender:
male; undergraduate; ﬁeld: other social science, junior)
• "In deciding to choose between Group 1 and 2, it made more sense to go with Group 1 when
they were prechosen by Kellogg and stats students. I felt more conﬁdent that these prechosen
sets of ﬁve would be better options and I would have more of chance in winning. The ﬁrst
explanation didn’t seem as impt. in choosing Group 1, so I chose Group 2 set of 50. However
I felt it was overwhelming to choose from a set of 50 so in the next round after receiving
feedback, I decided instead of picking a better number out of 50, to choose Group 1 since its
easier to pick among 5 numbers than 50." (age: 29; gender: female; graduate; ﬁeld: other
social science)
• "i ﬁgured that i could better choose between the smaller groups becasue i wouldnt be so over-
whelmed...and since i was choosing the best of each group..i eventually only picked the smaller
group - the group of 50 was just too daunting."(age: 22; gender: female; undergraduate; ﬁeld:
language, freshman)
5.2 Value-of-information types wrote...
• "I don’t know much about probabilities or lotteries, so I felt most conﬁdent when the small
group was chosen by Kellogg students or determined "the best" by the experiment organizers.
I ﬁgured I could select one randomly from the large group just as well as the computer
could, so I chose group B when group A was chosen randomly." (age: 19; gender: female;
undergraduate; ﬁeld: language/journalism, sophomore)
• "When the option was random I never chose the smaller group, but in the other two cases
I did taking into consideration that Kellogg students would have expertise and the other set
would always give me the same or higher payments." (age: 21; gender: female; undergraduate;
ﬁeld: economics, senior)
• "If the smaller group was chosen randomly from the larger group, I chose the larger group
because then none of the best lotteries would be eliminated. There was no point in choosing
the smaller group in this case. However, if the smaller group was chosen from the larger group
by knowledgeable students, or if the smaller group contained the best lottery tickets, I chose
the smaller group. There was no reason to go through all 25 lotteries in the larger group if I
knew the best were or most likely were in the smaller group of 5." (age: 19; gender: female;
undergraduate; ﬁeld: other social science, freshman)
30• "Every time except once (and that once was just for fun), I chose the large group when
the small group was to be randomly selected because I knew that I could at least randomly
select as good as the computer could. Every time the small group would be chosen by the
economics students to be the best I chose the small group because I thought the chances of
them reducing the total list down to the best 5 were better than my chances. Every time the
small group would be chosen to be the 5 best I chose the small group because I knew that
my chances of determining the 5 best were not always going to be 100%." (age: 21; gender:
male; undergraduate; ﬁeld: other social science, junior)
• "I selected groups based on whether I thought the selection method would let me pick the best
one. I did not want to lose the best ticket because of random selection. I trusted the Kellogg
students and the"truth".to this question...as stated earlier I tried to maximize expected value
of the ticket."
• "If the ﬁrst group was random, I selected the second group because I knew group 1 might
have eliminated the best lottery. For the group picked by Kellogg students, I ﬁgured they
could choose better than I could. And for the ’best’ group, I just trusted that those lotteries
were best. Plus, I didn’t enjoy thinking through all 50 or however many lotteries, so the
smaller groups were easier to think through." (age: 19; gender: female; undergraduate; ﬁeld:
language/journalism, freshman)
• "For choosing GROUPS, I never chose the "random" option; I preferred to sort through the
choices myself on the assumption that I am smarter than the random choices of the computer.
I chose the "Kellogg student-approved" and "best options" option after verifying that the 5
choices oﬀered there were also the 5 choices I had identiﬁed from the table as being good
bets." (age: 21; gender: female; undergraduate; ﬁeld: language, junior)
• "too many choices was bad. if the group was described as better in any way i perferred the
small one not especially because it was chosen by grad students mostly because it was smaller
and therefore easier to process." (age: 20; gender: female; undergraduate; ﬁeld: biology,
junior)
5.3 More is better types wrote...
• "I would always choose the one with the most options. Other people (such as the graduate
students), might have diﬀerent priorities from me, and I wanted a potential for higher payouts,
not just a better chance of getting a decent amount of money."
• "Since the subset exists of all lotteries in the large set, I can pick from the large set on my
own instead of having my choices limited by some other mechanism.".
• "I felt that my decision making ability in choosing the lotteries was better then anyone elses,
so I prefered to just choose from the 50 as the smaller group was just a subset of the larger
3150". (age: 21; gender: male; undergraduate; ﬁeld: econ/engineering, junior)
• "I picked the bigger group so I could make my own decision". (age: 22; gender: male;
undergraduate; ﬁeld: engineering, senior)
• "1) choosing B was a no-brainer. why give control to randomness? 2) i understand the
process in which the set in A was chosen, but i don’t know enough about the kellogg/grad
students’ risk preferences and utility function of money. for me, i am relatively risk averse
a n dw a n tt oc o m ea w a yw i t ha tl e a s tac e r t a i na m o u n t( w h i c hc a m eo u tt ob ei nt h er a n g eo f
4 plus 7/8/9). i don’t know if the grad students share this same attitude. 3) again, i don’t
know how the computer judges what is "better" or higher payout - the expected value of the
payout, based on pure probabilities [=P(A)A +P(B)B]? or does the computer also take into
account a utility function for money? if so, i still don’t know what that function is, so it
would be risky to go by what the computer CLAIMS to be better." (age: 20; gender: male;
undergraduate; ﬁeld: economics, junior)
• Almost of the times I chose the large group, I prefer to select my lottery than let the decision to
a random machine (no many probabilities to get the best choices) or to the Kellogg students,
which might have been to conservatives. A couple of times I chose "the best group of lotteries"
option, because I knew I was going to have the higher prizes there. (age: 28; gender: male;
graduate; ﬁeld: language/journalism)
• "Generally, I only chose "Group one" when it was guaranteed to pay as well or higher than
"Group two." I was conﬁdent in my ability to choose the best ticket on my own, if it was not
done for me." (age: 20; gender: male; undergraduate; ﬁeld: language/journalism; sophomore)
5.4 Procedures
I now show what some of the participants wrote in response to the following question in the last
part of the experiment: Please tell us about your strategy for choosing between lottery tickets
within a group. I would really appreciate a detailed response to this question."
• “I looked for the highest low numbers. Then judged between tickets that had low numbers
of 7 or 8, based on probability and how much I wanted to risk the extra dollar, etc”
• “I was looking for the best percentage chance of a double digit win, as a way to be able to
more quickly scan through the lotteries. I was looking for a .6 in a low double digit or a .5 or
.4 percent chance at a higher double digit win”
• “I chose prizes higher than 10 that had a 0.4 probability or better”
• "Risk adverse decisions. Eliminated choices that the lowest output would be less than ~40%
of the total amt."
32• "I decided that I wanted at least $6 so I looked for choices that guarenteed a minimum of
$6. After that if there were ones that guarenteed higher payments such as $7 or $8 I usually
went with that one. If it was between one that was $7 and $17 versus $8 and $9 I chose the
$7 and $17 because there was a possibility that I could get $17 and I was already above my
minimum of $6. $6 was just an arbitrary choice."
• "I just tried to add up the expected value of each ticket and pick the highest. Any mistake I
made any picking the subo-optimal expected value was due to mental math errors."
• "I took the sum of each ticket’s payoﬀs times their probabilities. That gets you the ’expected
return.’ That’s the average amount I would get from each ticket. That’s why it took so long."
• "if there was at least a .4 chance of getting a large prize, i usually chose that. it was really
an arbitrary choice, but it just seemed close enough to .5 to seem possible, and, of course, i
would prefer a larger prize."
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, I investigate in a laboratory experiment the reasons for why individuals may prefer to
have fewer options. The aim is to identify whether behavior is consistent with value-of-information
or cognitive overload. According to value-of-information, an individual will prefer to have fewer
options if he believes a smaller set provides him with information about the ranking of the alter-
natives, thus allowing him to save the costs of contemplation. According to the cognitive overload
argument, decision costs may be increasing in the size of the choice set because individuals neces-
sarily contemplate more alternatives as their choice set expands. Thus, decision costs may increase
more than the beneﬁts as individuals face more options, and thus a smaller set may be preferred.
I conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate why individuals may prefer to have fewer
options. Participants choose between small and large sets of lotteries in which the selection mech-
anism of the smaller set varied. Participants could not observe the small set. They observed only
the large set and the information about how the lotteries in the small set were selected from the
large set. After choosing the set, they would see it and choose one lottery from it. Small sets
were selected from the large sets either randomly, by economics and Kellogg graduate students, or
by including the only 5 undominated lotteries. Participants in Group 1 faced large sets with 25
lotteries, while participants in Group 2 faced large sets with 50 lotteries.
I found that 32% of participants in Group 1 and 48% of participants in Group 2 chose the small
set under random selection, in support of cognitive overload. When selection was done by graduate
students, around 70% of participants chose the small set in both groups 1 and 2. The numbers
were similar when the small sets contained all ﬁve undominated lotteries.
The classiﬁcation by types shows an increase in the relative importance of cognitive overload in
Group 2 relative to Group 1. While 20% of participants choose the small sets in all three selection
mechanisms (cognitive overload types) in Group 1, 33% did so in Group 2, showing that cognitive
33overload is important. In contrast, 43% of participants were classiﬁed as value-of-information
types in Group 1, while 22% were classiﬁed as such in Group 2. This decrease in the proportion
of participants classiﬁed as value-of-information types is consistent with increasing contemplation
costs as the choice set increases in Group 1 to Group 2. I also shows that value-of-information is
an important explanation for participants to prefer fewer options. The proportion of participants
classiﬁed as more is better types was 19% in Group 1 and 15% in Group 2. Thus, the commonly
used assumption in economics that people prefer to have more options is clearly violated in the
data. In contrast, people seem to prefer fewer options largely due to value-of-information and
cognitive overload. The relative importance of these two arguments seems to depend on the size of
the choice sets.
When participants were given feedback about their choices of lotteries, the results changed
in favor or value-of-information, as choice of the randomly selected sets decreased considerably.
Thus, participants seemed aware that randomly selected sets would likely have worse lotteries and
anticipated negative feedback when choosing these sets. Moreover, this negative feedback reduced
utility from the random sets, aﬀecting decisions.
When the large set was repeated to study the eﬀect of experience and no feedback was given
after choices, the proportion of randomly selected increased considerably relative to when feedback
was given. In fact, there was a statistically signiﬁcant positive trend in the choice of small randomly
selected sets for Group 2, suggesting that experience with the large set made participants aware of
the diﬃculty of the decision. A similar eﬀect was found in the choice of sets selected by graduate
students. Thus, I ﬁnd that preference for fewer options does not go away, and even increases with
experience with the decision.
In treatment 2, participants were given the sets of lotteries and asked to choose one lottery
from each set. Thus, they did not choose between sets. I found that self selection into large sets in
treatment 1 is related to higher ability. Participants who had below average performance in terms
of choosing undominated lotteries from large sets did not choose them as often as those who had
above average performance. In fact, they often chose small sets that were randomly selected, and
thus were likely to have relatively worse lotteries. Therefore, they seemed to prefer not choosing
a dominated lottery directly. One possible explanation is that participants were not willing to
randomly select lotteries, and this generated cognitive overload. To avoid it, participants preferred
to choose lotteries from smaller sets.
Thus, although a large part of economics is based on the assumption that individuals always
want more choice, the data in this experiment shows that a relatively small percentage of individuals
actually behaving consistently with this assumption. This is true even after participants have
experience with the decision problem. I investigated possible reasons for this behavior and found
that both, cognitive overload and value-of-information, are important in explaining the results.
These ﬁndings are important for ﬁrms’ choices of product variety, as costs increase with the
number of products oﬀered. If consumers are better oﬀ with less variety, then ﬁrms can increase
proﬁts by reducing product lines. By understanding why individuals prefer to have fewer options,
34ﬁrms can design strategies in which they can reduce product variety while increasing sales. The
ﬁndings in this paper suggest that simply reducing assortment may have these eﬀects, as part of the
consumers just seem to want fewer options. In addition, providing information about the selection
in a way that is convincing to customers may attract more consumers, and thus should be a more
proﬁtable strategy.
The results in this paper can also help in the design of government policies, such as the Medicare
Drug Discount Card Program, which has shown much lower than expected enrollment. Simple
measures such as reducing the number of cards available or providing a list of recommended cards
selected by a group of experts could increase enrollment and thus induce important improvements
in welfare.
7 References
1. Banerjee, A. (1992). "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
CVII, 797-817.
2. Bayus, B. and Putsis, W. (1999). "Product proliferation: An empirical analysis of product
line determinants and market outcomes", Marketing Science 18, 137—153.
3. Bettman, J. (1979). An Information Processing Theory of Consumer Choice, Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley.
4. Bertrand, M., Karlan, D., Mullainathan, S., Shaﬁr, E. and Zinman, J. (2005). "What’s
Psychology Worth? A Field Experiment in the Consumer Credit Market," Working Paper.
5. Bikhchandani, S.,Hirshleifer, D. and I. Welch (1992). “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom,
and Cultural Change as Information Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy, 100, 992—1026.
6. Boatwright, P. and Nunes, J. (2001). "Reducing Assortment: An Attribute-Based Approach,"
Journal of Marketing 65, 50-63.
7. Cuzick, J. (1985). "A Method for Analyzing Case-Control Studies with Ordinal Exposure
Variables," Biometrics 49, 609-621.
8. Deci, E. (1975). Intrinsic Motivation. New York: Plenum Press.
9. Deci, E. and Ryan, R. (1985). Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behav-
ior. New York: Plenum Press.
10. Draganska, M. and Jain, D. (2005). "Product-Line Length as a Competitive Tool," Journal
of Economics and Management Strategy, forthcoming.
11. Ergin, H. (2003). "Costly Contemplation". Working Paper.
3512. Gul, F. and Pesendorfer, W. (2001). "Temptation and Self-Control," Econometrica 69, 1403-
1435.
13. Holt, C. and Laury, S. (2002). "Risk Aversion and Incentive Eﬀects," American Economic
Review 92, 1644-1655.
14. Huﬀman, C. and Kahn, E. (1998). "Variety for Sale: Mass Customization or Mass Confusion,"
Journal of Retailing 74, 491-513.
15. Iyengar, S. Jiang,W. and Huberman, G. (2004). "How Much Choice is Too Much?: Determi-
nants of Individual Contributions in 401(k) Retirement Plans." Working Paper.
16. Iyengar, S. and Lepper, M. (2000). "When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too
Much of a Good Thing?", J o u r n a lo fP e r s o n a l i t ya n dS o c i a lP s y c h o l o g y76, 995-1006.
17. Jacoby, J. (1984). "Perspectives on Information Overload," J o u r n a lo fC o n s u m e rR e s e a r c h
10, 432-35.
18. Kreps, D. (1979). "A Representation Theorem for "Preference for Flexibility," Econometrica
47, 565-578.
19. Langer, E. (1975). "The Illusion of Control," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
32, 311-328.
20. Loomes, G., and Sugden, R. (1982). "Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational
Choice Under Uncertainty," The Economic Journal 92, 805-824
21. Luce, D. R., and H. Raiﬀa (1957): Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.
Wiley, New York.
22. Malhotra, N. (1982). "Information Load and Consumer Decision Making," Journal of Con-
sumer Research 8, 419-430.
23. Manski, C. (2000). "Identiﬁcation problems and decisions under ambiguity: Empirical analy-
sis of treatment response and normative analysis of treatment choice," Journal of Economet-
rics 95,.415-442.
24. McFadden, D. (1999). "Rationality for Economists," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19,
73-105.
25. Payne, J. (1982). Contingent decision behavior. Psychological Bulletin 92, 382-402.
26. Ravenscraft, D. (1983). "Structure-proﬁt relationships at the line of business and industry
level", Review of Economics and Statistics 65, 22—31.
27. Russo, J. E. and Dosher, B.A. (1983). Strategies for multiattribute binary choice. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition 9, 676-696.
3628. Schulz, R. and Hanusa, B. (1978). "Long-term eﬀects of control and predictability-enhancing
interventions: Findings and ethical issues,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36,
1194-12-1.
29. Simon, H. (1956). "Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment," Psychological
Review 63, 129-38.
30. Simon, H. (1997). Models of Bounded Rationality. Volume 3. Empirically Grounded Eco-
nomic Reason. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
31. Taylor, S. (1989). Positive illusions: Creative self-deception and the healthy mind: New York:
Basic Books.
32. Taylor, S. and Brown, J. (1988). "Illusion and well-being: a social psychological perspective
on mental health,” Psychological Bulletin 103, 193-210.
33. Tversky, A. (1972). "Elimination by Aspects: Theory of Choice." Psychological Review 79,
281-299.
34. Tversky, A., Sattath, S. and Slovic, P. (1988). Contingent Weighing in Judgement and Choice.
Psychological Review 95, 371-384.
35. Timmermans, D. (1993). The impact of task complexity on information use in multi-attribute
decision making. J o u r n a lo fB e h a v i o r a lD e c i s i o nM a k i n g6, 95-111.
36. Wright, P. (1975). "Consumer Choice Strategies: Simplifying vs Optimizing," Journal of
Marketing Research 12, 60-67
8 Appendix A: Value-of-information
This section presents a model in which an individual has uncertainty about his preferences when
choosing an alternative from a set. He can engage in costly contemplation to reduce this uncer-
tainty, interpreted as the eﬀort and time spent in making the decision. The individual chooses the
amount of contemplation. If he chooses not to contemplate, these costs equal zero. The more he
contemplates, the higher the cost, but the lower the uncertainty when selecting an alternative from
the choice set. Therefore, ﬁrst the amount of contemplation is chosen, and then one alternative
is selected taking into account the information gathered and processed through contemplation. In
this case, the individual may prefer a subset of a larger set, depending on his beliefs regarding how
these options were selected. A smaller set may be preferred when it is believed to provide informa-
tion about the ranking of the alternatives that otherwise would have to be acquired through costly
contemplation.
Denote by X the ﬁnite set of all possible alternatives ever encountered by an individual and
P(X) the set of all nonempty subsets of X, i.e., all menus an individual can face. Let < be a binary
37preference relation on X, and the state-space S t h ep o s s i b l ep r e f e r e n c eo r d e r i n g so ft h ee l e m e n t s
in X. Denote by μ the probability distribution over S, representing the individual’s priors over
the state-space. Thus μ represents the individual’s priors regarding his preference ordering of the
elements in X before any contemplation.
A set of partitions of S is given by Π(S), with {S} ⊂ Π(S). For any s ∈ S and π ∈ Π(S),π (s)
denotes the element of partition π that s belongs to. Thus, partition π reveals where in S the truth
lies in. For π,ρ ∈ Π(S),π≥f ρ means that π is a weakly ﬁner partition than ρ. A ﬁner partition
implies the decision maker has more information, since he knows the true state of the world lies in
a smaller subset of S.
Let A ⊂ X be the choice set faced by the decision maker. Before contemplating, the agent does
not observe which elements are in A. This is equivalent to observing the elements but not knowing
how A was generated. Instead, he imagines facing any of Aj ∈ X, j =1 ,...,J sets of alternatives.
His utility from A will depend on how likely he believes the diﬀerent Aj ’s are. For example, if the
individual believes the set A was generated to be in line with his preferences, then he will assign
high probabilities to Aj ’s that give him high utility, and low probabilities to Aj ’s that give him
low utility. This will become more clear next, when I formalize individual beliefs about Aj and
show how they aﬀect the utility from A.
Let T denote the state-space of possible selections Aj,j =1 ,...,J conditional on the state of
the world s f a c e db yt h ea g e n tw i t hc h o i c es e tA.L e t pA be a probability distribution over T.
Then pA represents the probability distribution over selections, conditional on s.T h e r e f o r e , pA
reveals the agent’s conﬁdence of how well A is aligned with his preferences if he contemplated fully.
For example, the individual may believe that a set A will contain his most preferred alternative,
whatever his tastes turn out to be. In this case, he will assign probability zero to receiving a set
Aj that does not contain his most alternative for every possible state of the world s.
The agent maximizes expected utility, with state-dependent utility function u : X × S → R.
He can reduce uncertainty using a costly contemplation strategy, represented by the choice of a
partition π ∈ Π(S),w i t hc : Π(S) → R+ being the contemplation cost function. Let c be monotone
in that π ≥f ρ implies c(π) ≥ c(ρ), i.e., reducing uncertainty is always weakly more costly. I assume
for simplicity that c(π0)=0( thus c({S})=0 ) , i.e., the cost of zero contemplation equals zero.
An individual who believes is facing Aj ⊆ X and uses contemplation strategy π ∈ Π(S) knows
the true state of the world s lies in E = π(s). Therefore, he restricts his maximization problem so
that only states of the world in E are considered. For contemplation strategy π, the decision maker





μ(s|E)u(x,s) − c(π) (1)
The contemplation strategy π is chosen by maximizing the ex-ante value of contemplation. The
38problem can be written as:













His utility from set A depends on his priors over Aj, conditional on A a n do ne a c hs t a t eo ft h e







From (3), it is possible to compare the utilities derived from all subsets A ∈ P(X). The following
lemma shows that if contemplation is costless, monotonicity will hold.
Lemma 1 If c(·)=0 , then ∀ B,C ∈ P(X) with B ⊂ C,U(B) ≤ U(C). Thus, an individual is
always be better oﬀ with the larger set.
Proof. From (1), it can be seen that if c(·)=0 , an individual will fully contemplate to eliminate
his uncertainty, because max(·) is concave. Let uCk
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That is, U(B) ≤ U(C).
I now show that if contemplation is costly, there exists beliefs about the composition of the
choice sets such an agent will have higher utility with fewer rather than more options.
Proposition 2 Assume c(·) > 0 and B,C ⊂ X with B ⊂ C. There exists beliefs pC(·|s) and
pB(·|s) such that U(C) <U(B). Thus, the smaller set makes the individual better oﬀ.
Proof. Let Bj ⊂ B, Ck ⊂ C.∀j,k and
uX
s =m a x
x∈X
u(x,s) and xX
s =a r gm a x
x∈X
u(x,s) (5)
39Assume the following beliefs pB(·|s):
pB(Bj|s)=
(


























In this case, the agent believes that the small set predicts his tastes perfectly, even though it
contains only one alternative. Meanwhile, it reduces the amount of contemplation needed to solve
the decision to zero. Therefore, ex-ante, this set provides the individual with higher utility than
any other set. Because the individual believes that the small set has one alternative that will give
him the highest utility for every realization of the state of the world, the set is viewed as providing
information about the ranking of the alternatives, and reduces the need of the agent to contemplate
them. This happens when one delegates a decision to someone we fully trust to save the costs of
gathering and processing information.
I now show that if the agent believes a small set is randomly selected from a large set, the large
set will give him higher utility.
Remark 3 Let c(·) > 0,B , with B ⊂ C ⊂ X.L e t NB and NC be the number of alternatives
is B and C respectively. Assume the agent knows the number of alternatives in B,a n du s e s
this information when forming beliefs about the composition of B.L e t Bj ⊂ B, Ck ⊂ C,a n d







That is, the agent believes that the alternatives in B are a random selection of the alternatives in

























































Therefore, a given set is always better than a subset whose alternatives are believed to be ran-
domly selected from it. This happens because the smaller set reduces the options to the individual
without providing him with any information. In the model, this means that the individual believes
the small set is generated independently of the state of the world, i.e., of his preference ordering.
In fact, the individual can replicate a randomly selected smaller set himself by randomly ignoring
alternatives from the larger set. Because taking them into account may be beneﬁcial, he will be
weakly better oﬀ with the larger set. Thus, it is because the individual believes that sets may be
generated in a way that depends on the state of the world that it is possible to have preference for
fewer options.
Note the importance of the uncertainty regarding the composition of the set. When there is no
such uncertainty, Ergin (2003) proves a representation theorem for preferences in which the utility
function derived incorporates contemplation costs that can be used to reduce uncertainty. His key
axiom is monotonicity; that is, more options are weakly preferred by the agent. Because individuals
can ignore extra alternatives as their choice set increases in size. When this is true, individuals
contemplate only when doing so increases beneﬁts more than costs.
9 Appendix B: Instructions
Note: I show the instructions for treatment 1. The instructions for the other treatments are similar
and are available upon request.
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment on individual decision making! Please
do not talk to anyone during the experiment, or look at what anyone else is doing. You may ask
questions at any time. The experiment will begin once you click "Continue".
I are interested in learning your tastes for "lottery tickets" and groups of lottery tickets. A
lottery ticket gives probabilities with which you will get diﬀerent amounts of cash. An example of
a lottery ticket is to receive $15 with probability 0.6 and $9 with probability 0.4. Groups of lottery
tickets will be organized in tables. The rows will show diﬀerent lottery tickets. The columns will
contain the monetary prizes and the probabilities associated with each of these prizes. Table 1
gives an example of a group of two lottery tickets. Lottery 1 gives $10 with probability 0.5 and $8
with probability 0.5. Lottery 2 gives $20 with probability 0.2 and $1 with probability 0.8.
41Table 17: Table 1 - Example
lottery prize probability prize probability
1 10 0.5 8 0.5
2 20 0.2 1 0.8
Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
The experiment will consist of 2 stages in which you will make several decisions involving lottery
tickets. These will pay between $3 and $17. At the end of the experiment, one of the lottery tickets
that you choose will be selected to determine your earnings. This will be done as follows: with
probability 0.9, the lottery will be selected at random from your choices in Stage 1. With probability
0.1, the lottery will be selected at random from your choices in Stage 2. Therefore, your prize is
much more likely to depend on your decisions in Stage 1 than in Stage 2. The result of this lottery
ticket will be added to a $4 participation fee. Therefore, you will earn between $7 and $21. Click
"Continue" to go to the next slide.
Your choice of lotteries will determine your earnings, so you should make your decisions carefully.
Even though you will make many choices, only ONE of them will determine your cash prize.
Therefore, you should make all your decisions independently of each other. As soon as you are
ﬁnished, you may leave. You will now go to Stage 1. You will receive instructions only for the stage
that you are in. Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
Stage 1
First, you will be asked to choose between two groups of lottery tickets, a large group and a
small group. Then, you will get to pick one lottery ticket from each group that you choose. This
will be done in 3 rounds. In each round, there will be a large group with 25 lottery tickets, and a
small group with 5 lotteries selected from the large group. You will not be able to see the lotteries
in the small groups, but you will be told how they were selected from the large group, which you
will be able to see. Groups of lotteries will be diﬀerent in each of the 3 rounds. Therefore, the 3
rounds are completely independent of each other. You will now go through a practice round. This
will NOT count towards your cash prize. Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
42This is a practice round and will not count towards your cash prize. Please choose one of the
following groups of lottery tickets (check either (a) or (b)):
Group of 5 lottery tickets described 
below
Here you will receive information about how 
the group of 5 lottery tickets was selected 
from the group of 25 shown in (b). 
(a) (b)
0.6 6 0.4 8 25
0.5 7 0.5 4 24
0.8 3 0.2 12 23
0.7 7 0.3 10 22
0.2 11 0.8 4 21
0.4 4 0.6 11 20
0.8 3 0.2 15 19
0.2 8 0.8 5 18
0.7 4 0.3 7 17
0.5 10 0.5 7 16
0.7 5 0.3 10 15
0.5 3 0.5 12 14
0.5 9 0.5 7 13
0.6 5 0.4 14 12
0.2 11 0.8 6 11
0.3 8 0.7 6 10
0.5 3 0.5 9 9
0.9 5 0.1 10 8
0.6 11 0.4 6 7
0.5 7 0.5 7 6
0.2 14 0.8 3 5
0.6 3 0.4 12 4
0.5 7 0.5 5 3
0.8 4 0.2 8 2
0.4 3 0.6 9 1
probability prize probability prize lottery
0.6 6 0.4 8 25
0.5 7 0.5 4 24
0.8 3 0.2 12 23
0.7 7 0.3 10 22
0.2 11 0.8 4 21
0.4 4 0.6 11 20
0.8 3 0.2 15 19
0.2 8 0.8 5 18
0.7 4 0.3 7 17
0.5 10 0.5 7 16
0.7 5 0.3 10 15
0.5 3 0.5 12 14
0.5 9 0.5 7 13
0.6 5 0.4 14 12
0.2 11 0.8 6 11
0.3 8 0.7 6 10
0.5 3 0.5 9 9
0.9 5 0.1 10 8
0.6 11 0.4 6 7
0.5 7 0.5 7 6
0.2 14 0.8 3 5
0.6 3 0.4 12 4
0.5 7 0.5 5 3
0.8 4 0.2 8 2
0.4 3 0.6 9 1
probability prize probability prize lottery
Figure 8: Instructions: Example.
Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
[If participant clicks (a), he receives the following slide:]
Here’s the group of lottery tickets you selected. Please choose one lottery from this group.
0.8 3 0.2 15 5
0.5 7 0.5 5 4
0.5 3 0.5 9 3
0.2 11 0.8 4 2
0.5 3 0.5 12 1
probability prize probability prize lottery
Group of 5 lottery tickets
0.8 3 0.2 15 5
0.5 7 0.5 5 4
0.5 3 0.5 9 3
0.2 11 0.8 4 2
0.5 3 0.5 12 1
probability prize probability prize lottery
Group of 5 lottery tickets
Figure 9: Introduction: Example continued. Slide received if the small set is chosen.
Type the lottery number here:
43[If participant clicks (b), he receives the following slide:]
Here’s the group of lottery tickets you selected. Please choose one lottery from this group.
0.6 6 0.4 8 25
0.5 7 0.5 4 24
0.8 3 0.2 12 23
0.7 7 0.3 10 22
0.2 11 0.8 4 21
0.4 4 0.6 11 20
0.8 3 0.2 15 19
0.2 8 0.8 5 18
0.7 4 0.3 7 17
0.5 10 0.5 7 16
0.7 5 0.3 10 15
0.5 3 0.5 12 14
0.5 9 0.5 7 13
0.6 5 0.4 14 12
0.2 11 0.8 6 11
0.3 8 0.7 6 10
0.5 3 0.5 9 9
0.9 5 0.1 10 8
0.6 11 0.4 6 7
0.5 7 0.5 7 6
0.2 14 0.8 3 5
0.6 3 0.4 12 4
0.5 7 0.5 5 3
0.8 4 0.2 8 2
0.4 3 0.6 9 1
probability prize probability prize lottery
0.6 6 0.4 8 25
0.5 7 0.5 4 24
0.8 3 0.2 12 23
0.7 7 0.3 10 22
0.2 11 0.8 4 21
0.4 4 0.6 11 20
0.8 3 0.2 15 19
0.2 8 0.8 5 18
0.7 4 0.3 7 17
0.5 10 0.5 7 16
0.7 5 0.3 10 15
0.5 3 0.5 12 14
0.5 9 0.5 7 13
0.6 5 0.4 14 12
0.2 11 0.8 6 11
0.3 8 0.7 6 10
0.5 3 0.5 9 9
0.9 5 0.1 10 8
0.6 11 0.4 6 7
0.5 7 0.5 7 6
0.2 14 0.8 3 5
0.6 3 0.4 12 4
0.5 7 0.5 5 3
0.8 4 0.2 8 2
0.4 3 0.6 9 1
probability prize probability prize lottery
Figure 10: Introduction: Example continued. Slide received if the large set is chosen.
Type the lottery number here:
Now you are ready to make your decisions. For each of the following 3 rounds, ﬁrst choose
between the large group and the small group of lottery tickets. Then, choose one lottery ticket
from the group you selected. Groups are diﬀerent in each round. They are also diﬀerent from the
groups in the previous example. Recall that one of the lottery tickets that you choose throughout
the entire experiment will be selected to determine your cash prize. This is what you will earn, in
addition to the $4 participation fee. Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
44Please choose one of the following groups of lottery tickets (check either (a) or (b)):
Group of 5 lottery tickets described 
below
This group of 5 lottery tickets was randomly 
selected from the group of 25 shown in (b). 
This was done by having a computer 
program randomly select 5 numbers from 1 
to 25, corresponding to the 5 lotteries. If 
you want more details about how this was 
done, or what computer program was used, 
please ask the experimenter.
(a)
0.3 16 0.7 4 25
0.4 11 0.6 5 24
0.4 5 0.6 11 23
0.3 9 0.7 6 22
0.5 8 0.5 8 21
0.6 12 0.4 6 20
0.5 4 0.5 12 19
0.4 4 0.6 10 18
0.1 10 0.9 6 17
0.5 11 0.5 3 16
0.3 12 0.7 6 15
0.5 4 0.5 13 14
0.4 16 0.6 4 13
0.7 5 0.3 9 12
0.8 4 0.2 12 11
0.5 3 0.5 10 10
0.4 9 0.6 5 9
0.9 4 0.1 14 8
0.6 3 0.4 11 7
0.6 8 0.4 9 6
0.8 4 0.2 16 5
0.2 12 0.8 4 4
0.6 3 0.4 13 3
0.7 3 0.3 11 2
0.3 16 0.7 5 1
probability prize probability prize lottery
0.3 16 0.7 4 25
0.4 11 0.6 5 24
0.4 5 0.6 11 23
0.3 9 0.7 6 22
0.5 8 0.5 8 21
0.6 12 0.4 6 20
0.5 4 0.5 12 19
0.4 4 0.6 10 18
0.1 10 0.9 6 17
0.5 11 0.5 3 16
0.3 12 0.7 6 15
0.5 4 0.5 13 14
0.4 16 0.6 4 13
0.7 5 0.3 9 12
0.8 4 0.2 12 11
0.5 3 0.5 10 10
0.4 9 0.6 5 9
0.9 4 0.1 14 8
0.6 3 0.4 11 7
0.6 8 0.4 9 6
0.8 4 0.2 16 5
0.2 12 0.8 4 4
0.6 3 0.4 13 3
0.7 3 0.3 11 2
0.3 16 0.7 5 1
probability prize probability prize lottery
(b)
Figure 11: Instructions: Round 1.
Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
[If participant clicks (a), he is shown the small set. If he clicks (b), he is shown the large set.
This is ommitted here to save space. Full intructions can be requestion to the author.]
Please choose one of the following groups of lottery tickets (check either (a) or (b)): [See ﬁgure
12]
Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
[If participant clicks (a), he is shown the small set. If he clicks (b), he is shown the large set.
Available upon request]
Please choose one of the following groups of lottery tickets (check either (a) or (b)): [See ﬁgure
13]
Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
[If participant clicks (a), he is shown the small set. If he clicks (b), he is shown the large set.
Available upon request]
45Group of 5 lottery tickets described below
This group of 5 lotteries was selected from the 
group of 50 in (b) by 10 economics and Kellogg 
graduate students. These students have 
extensive training in statistics, and solve these 
kinds of problems all the time. Here are some 
details: 10 students were given the set of 50 
lotteries in (b) and asked to choose the 5 within 
the group which they thought were the best. 
This group contains 5 of the lotteries most 
frequently chosen by these 10 econ and Kellogg 
graduate students. If you need more details on 
this procedure or if you want to know more 
about who are the graduate students involved, 
please ask the experimenter.
(a) (b)
0.8 5 0.2 17 25
0.5 5 0.5 9 24
0.6 5 0.4 13 23
0.3 11 0.7 6 22
0.6 6 0.4 10 21
0.5 10 0.5 8 20
0.3 14 0.7 3 19
0.6 3 0.4 12 18
0.7 8 0.3 6 17
0.4 3 0.6 12 16
0.4 14 0.6 6 15
0.7 3 0.3 14 14
0.2 16 0.8 3 13
0.5 11 0.5 3 12
0.8 3 0.2 14 11
0.6 3 0.4 12 10
0.5 7 0.5 9 9
0.1 17 0.9 5 8
0.3 13 0.7 5 7
0.5 6 0.5 11 6
0.9 4 0.1 17 5
0.4 10 0.6 6 4
0.6 4 0.4 15 3
0.2 13 0.8 5 2
0.4 10 0.6 3 1
probability prize probability prize lottery
0.8 5 0.2 17 25
0.5 5 0.5 9 24
0.6 5 0.4 13 23
0.3 11 0.7 6 22
0.6 6 0.4 10 21
0.5 10 0.5 8 20
0.3 14 0.7 3 19
0.6 3 0.4 12 18
0.7 8 0.3 6 17
0.4 3 0.6 12 16
0.4 14 0.6 6 15
0.7 3 0.3 14 14
0.2 16 0.8 3 13
0.5 11 0.5 3 12
0.8 3 0.2 14 11
0.6 3 0.4 12 10
0.5 7 0.5 9 9
0.1 17 0.9 5 8
0.3 13 0.7 5 7
0.5 6 0.5 11 6
0.9 4 0.1 17 5
0.4 10 0.6 6 4
0.6 4 0.4 15 3
0.2 13 0.8 5 2
0.4 10 0.6 3 1
probability prize probability prize lottery
Figure 12: Instructions: Round 2.
Group of 5 lottery tickets described below
This group of 5 lottery tickets was selected by 
taking the 5 best lotteries in the group of 50 
shown in (b). This means that the lotteries in the 
small group will give you at least the same 
amount of money as the lotteries in the large 
group, and possibly more. Alternatively, for each 
lottery in the large group, there is a lottery in the 
small group that will give you at least the same 
amount of money, and possibly more.
(a) (b)
0.5 8 0.5 4 25
0.7 3 0.3 15 24
0.6 4 0.4 14 23
0.5 10 0.5 4 22
0.4 11 0.6 4 21
0.3 16 0.7 3 20
0.7 4 0.3 11 19
0.5 13 0.5 3 18
0.1 7 0.9 8 17
0.5 12 0.5 4 16
0.8 6 0.2 17 15
0.7 4 0.3 12 14
0.8 10 0.2 5 13
0.4 16 0.6 4 12
0.3 8 0.7 5 11
0.4 4 0.6 10 10
0.5 5 0.5 10 9
0.6 13 0.4 4 8
0.5 4 0.5 11 7
0.6 9 0.4 5 6
0.2 15 0.8 3 5
0.7 4 0.3 10 4
0.5 5 0.5 8 3
0.4 10 0.6 4 2
0.8 4 0.2 12 1
probability prize probability prize lottery
0.5 8 0.5 4 25
0.7 3 0.3 15 24
0.6 4 0.4 14 23
0.5 10 0.5 4 22
0.4 11 0.6 4 21
0.3 16 0.7 3 20
0.7 4 0.3 11 19
0.5 13 0.5 3 18
0.1 7 0.9 8 17
0.5 12 0.5 4 16
0.8 6 0.2 17 15
0.7 4 0.3 12 14
0.8 10 0.2 5 13
0.4 16 0.6 4 12
0.3 8 0.7 5 11
0.4 4 0.6 10 10
0.5 5 0.5 10 9
0.6 13 0.4 4 8
0.5 4 0.5 11 7
0.6 9 0.4 5 6
0.2 15 0.8 3 5
0.7 4 0.3 10 4
0.5 5 0.5 8 3
0.4 10 0.6 4 2
0.8 4 0.2 12 1
probability prize probability prize lottery
Figure 13: Instructions: Round 3.
46You will now be asked to make decisions in which you receive feedback regarding your choices
of lottery tickets. That is, for each choice, you will be told whether or not there was a lottery ticket
in the group that was better than the one you picked. You will get this information after you have
made all your choices, but you will not be allowed to change them. You will do this in 3 rounds.
Here’s an example:
Assume your choices of lotteries in the 3 rounds were: (1) Lottery #1; (2) Lottery #3; (3)
Lottery #5. An example of feedback you could receive is:
1. You could have chosen a lottery that gave you a higher cash prize for sure. Therefore, this
was a bad choice.
2. There was no way you could have chosen a lottery that gave you a higher cash prize for sure.
Therefore, you made a good choice. Congratulations!
3. You could have chosen a lottery that gave you a higher cash prize for sure. Therefore, this
was a bad choice.
The feedback will be displayed on your screen after all choices have been made. Click "Continue"
to go to the next slide.
For each of the following 3 rounds, please choose between the large group and the small group
of lottery tickets (check either (a) or (b)). Remember that in each round, the small group is a
subset of the large group. You will be told how the lottery tickets in the small group were selected
from the large group. Groups are diﬀerent in each round. Recall that one of the lottery tickets
that you choose throughout the entire experiment will be selected to determine your cash prize.
This is what you will earn, in addition to the $4 participation fee. At the end of the 3 rounds, you
will receive feedback that will tell you how well you did in your choices of lottery tickets, when
compared to other lotteries from the group. Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
Please choose one of the following groups of lottery tickets (check either (a) or (b)):
[Similar to rounds 1-3. Ommitted to save space but available upon request]
Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
Please choose one of the following groups of lottery tickets (check either (a) or (b)):
[Similar to rounds 1-3. Ommitted to save space but available upon request]
Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
Please choose one of the following groups of lottery tickets (check either (a) or (b)):
[Similar to rounds 1-3. Ommitted to save space but available upon request]
Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
Here’s feedback in how you did in choosing the lottery tickets
471. [Feedback is given here]
2. [Feedback is given here]
3. [Feedback is given here]
Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
Now, you will again be asked to choose between two groups of lottery tickets. Then, you will
get to pick one lottery ticket from each group that you choose. As before, the large group will have
25 lottery tickets, and the small group will have 5 lotteries selected from the large group. You will
not be able to see the lotteries in the small groups, but you will be told how they were selected
from the large group, which you will be able to see. You will NOT receive any feedback after you
have made your choices. All groups of lotteries are diﬀerent than the ones you were faced with in
Stage 1.
[Sequence of rounds similar to 1-3. Ommitted to save space but available upon request]
You have now ﬁnished Stage 1 and will begin Stage 2. In this stage, you will be asked to choose
between two lottery tickets in several rounds. As before, the lottery tickets will be displayed in
tables. For each round, please indicate which lottery ticket you prefer (type the lottery number in
the space provided). You will be allowed to go back and forth between rounds and make changes
to your answers if you desire to do so. Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
Please choose one lottery ticket from the following group. Type the lottery number in the space
provided.
[Holt and Laury procedure was described in section 3. Ommitted to save space but available
upon request]
Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
You are now ﬁnished with the two stages. Before making payments, I will ask you to answer a
few questions about your experience during the experiment, as well as some demographic questions.
Click "Continue" to go to the next slide.
1. Referring back to Stage 1, think about the decisions in which you DID NOT receive feedback.
On average, what do you think is the percent chance that you chose the lottery ticket that
was best for you in the group (the answer must be a number from 0 to 100).
2. Again in Stage 1, think about the decisions in which you DID receive feedback. On average,
what do you think is the percent chance that you chose the lottery ticket that was best for
you in the group (the answer must be a number from 0 to 100)., how did that make you feel?
(If you did not receive this kind of feedback, please explain here).
3. Please tell us about your strategy for choosing between GROUPS of lottery tickets. I would
really appreciate a detailed response to this question.
484. Please tell us about your strategy for choosing between lottery tickets within a group. I would
really appreciate a detailed response to this question.
5. What is your age?
6. Your gender is:
(a) Female
(b) Male
7. Which best describes your program at Northwestern?
(a) Undergraduate
(b) Graduate




(d) Language, literature or journalism
(e) Math or statistics
(f) Psychology
(g) Other social sciences
(h) Other tech ﬁelds
(i) Other (please specify)





(e) I’m a graduate student
10. To give us information about your familiarity with statistics, please pick the most advanced
course in statistics that you have ever taken:
(a) I have never taken any courses in statistics.
(b) High school level statistics.
49(c) Undergraduate introductory level course in statistics such as 202, or AP statistics test
in High School.
(d) Undergraduate intermediate or advanced course in statistics, such as 330, or economet-
rics, such as 281.
(e) Graduate course in statistics.
11. To give us information about your familiarity with economics, please pick the most advanced
course in economics that you have ever taken:
(a) I have never taken any courses in economics.
(b) Undergraduate introductory level course in economics such as 201 or 202.
(c) Undergraduate intermediate or advanced course in economics, such as 310 or 311.
(d) Graduate course in economics.
Thanks for answering these questions. You are now ﬁnished with the experiment. Please call
the experimenter, so that your total cash prize can be calculated.
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